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Abstract 
The re-regulation of electric power industry around the world has raised many new 
challenges for all stakeholders. This research is to valuate generation assets within re-
regulated electricity markets, both in short-term and long-term. The focus is to valuate 
operation flexibility under market uncertainties from the viewpoint of a Generation Company 
(GENCO). 
This research proposes to model the movements of electricity markets with Hidden 
Markov Model (HMM) driven by underlying market forces. An electricity market is 
modeled as a dynamic system evolving over time according to Markov processes. At any 
time interval, the electricity market can be in one state and transit to another state in the next 
time interval. The true market states are hidden from a market participant behind the 
incomplete observation. The observations, such as market-clearing price and quantity, are 
modeled to follow multiple probabilistic distributions. 
This research proposes to further decompose the market forces into physical and 
economic drivers if a specific electricity market employs Location Marginal Price (LMP) 
mechanism. The physical drivers include transmission network topology and generation 
technology. The economic drivers include fuel prices, demand uncertainties, and profit 
maximization of market participants with incomplete information. The decomposition 
captures the strengths of engineering-based production cost approach and mark-to-market 
stochastic approach. 
This research valuates generation assets with real option analysis. The value of 
generation assets is maximized based on the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and newest 
observation of electricity markets. Such an optimization problem is formulated as Partially 
Oberserable Markov Decision Problem (POMDP). The solution of a POMDP provides a 
GENCO both the optimal operating policy and values of generation assets. The value of 
perfect and imperfect information is also identified. 
Investment in generation assets is also analyzed with real option. This research 
incorporates fuzzy sets and numbers to capture the fuzziness and possibilities of long-term 
electricity markets movements. Fuzzy sets and numbers provide the modeler flexibilities to 
X 
incorporate subjective judgments when rigorous approaches are not feasible. The real call 
options, capturing the investment value of generation assets, are formulated as Markov 
Decision Process (MDP) and solved with fuzzy linear programming. 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter gives an introduction to the re-regulation of the electric power industry. 
The objective of this work is outlined in section 1.2. Section 1.3 provides a market 
framework assumed for this work. The accomplished work and contributions of this research 
are given in Section 1.4. This chapter concludes with an introduction to the organization of 
this document. 
1.1 Electric Power Industry Re-regulation 
The economic incentives to pursue cheap and reliable electric power supply have led 
the electric power industry from un-regulated to regulation then re-regulation. Appendix A-l 
summarizes the evolution of the U.S. electric power industry and defines the background of 
this document. More details on the evolution of U.S. electric power industry could be found 
in [1], 
The electric power industry re-structuring has proposed, investigated, and 
implemented a variety of electricity market models. Those models differ in their market 
structures and market architectures. Market structure is defined as properties closely tied to 
technology and ownership. Market architecture refers to a set of sub-markets and the 
linkages between them [1], 
The notion of market structure was developed initially as part of the "structure-
conduct-performance" paradigm of industrial organization in the early 1950s [3]. The classic 
market structure focuses on the ownership of production capacity. One of the most popular 
indexes is Hirschmann Herfindahl Index (HHI), which is defined as in Equation 1. A 
regulated utility is given the franchise to operate in a regional electricity market, which leads 
to an HHI = 10000. 
2 
=  V i , X , > X , „ > 0  
1=1 
X: % = Market Share of Producer i, 
Equation 1: Definition of Hirschmann Herfindahl Index 
Regulatory agencies re-constructs electric power industry by breaking vertically 
integrated electric utilities into horizontally independent entities including Generation 
Company (GENCO), Transmission Company (TRANSCO), Distribution Company (DISCO), 
Electric Service Company (ESCO), and Electricity Management Company (EMCO) among 
other possibilities. The institutional decoupling of electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution lays down the economic foundation of electricity markets. The physical 
foundation of electricity markets, open and equal access to transmission and distribution 
networks, is provided by Independent System Operators (ISO)ZRegional Transmission 
Organizations (RTO). Both the physical side and financial side of an electricity market are 
under the authority of regulatory agencies. Figure 1 shows a conceptual market structure. 
Regulatory Agencies 
Physical System Operating 
Generation GENCO 
I r insrn1 ->i n 
Diil' 'iilii-n 
TRANSCO 
DISCO 
Load ESCO/EMCO 
Market Coordination 
Electric Power System (Physical Side) Electricity Market (Financial Side) 
Figure 1: Market Structure of Electricity Market 
Most restructuring models share the decoupling of vertically integrated utilities. 
However, significant differences in market structures have been observed. The differences 
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mainly concern on the assignments of physical system operating and market coordination. 
Some electricity markets institutionalize business intermediaries, who deal directly with 
transmission service providers on behalf of GENCOs and ESCOs/EMCOs. Such 
intermediaries include centralized, wholesale power pools or Power Exchanges (PX), as well 
as aggregators of bilateral energy service contracts, genetically referred to here as Scheduling 
Coordinators (SCs). Not all of these entities need to be present in any specific restructuring 
model. In some cases the centralized energy market (PX) does not exist, and in other cases it 
is merged with the ISO. The bilateral market represented by the SCs may or may not be 
provided, depending on the structure adopted. Figure 2 shows the structural difference 
between existing and evolving electricity markets, where adjoining boundaries indicate that 
the services are provided by a single entity. A brief comparison of some exiting electricity 
market frameworks can be found in Appendix A-2. The timeline for the coordination work 
carried out by California ISO and SCs are illustrated in Appendix A-3. 
CALIFORNIA NGC YICTORI AP.TM 
PX ISO 
SC TO 
PX ISO 
TO 
PX ISO 
TO 
NORWAY NEW ZEALAND ERCOT/MIDWEST 
ISO 
TO 
PX ISO 
TO SC 
ISO 
TO 
Figure 2: Difference of Market Structure 
The technology part of electricity market structure has also seen significant 
developments, both in electricity generation and transmission. The advances of electric 
power generation technology have changed the generation stack. Natural gas has become a 
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significant source of generating electric power for high efficiency of combined cycle 
combustion unit and low emission cost. Renewable energy has seen more and more 
commercial installments, especially wind energy. Table 1 illustrates the electricity 
generation composition of several regional electricity markets in North America [4], It is 
shown that the generation composition could be significantly different between electricity 
markets. The development of control and communication technology provides essential 
supports for offering open and equal access to an integrated electric power system. 
Table 1: Generation Composition of North American Electricity Markets 
PJM NERTO NYISO ERCOT CA 
Gas 31% 32% 90% 75% 46% 
Oil 21% 28% 74% 38% 1% 
Coal 37% 9% 0% 21% 0% 
Nuclear 21% 16% 0% 7% 9% 
Hydro 5% 12% 1% 1% 23% 
Others 1% 2% 0% 0% 21% 
Some generator could switch fuels, thus the sums of percentages do not necessarily equal to 100%. 
Market structure defines the players of an electricity market and their competition 
positions while market architecture defines how the entities interact and exchange both 
commodities and information. The market architecture design must consider the market 
structure in which it is embedded, which may inhibit the proper function of some designs. 
Market architecture defines a set of sub-markets and the linkages between them. The 
linkages between sub-markets may be implicit price linkages bound by arbitrage or explicit 
rules linking rights purchased in one market to activity in another. The sub-markets of an 
electricity market could be defined by many criteria, including: 
• Commodity traded 
The main physically deliverable commodities traded in electricity markets are electric 
energy and ancillary services. In some market architecture, electric energy and ancillary 
services are bundled together while other markets trade them separately. The discussion on 
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whether electric energy and ancillary services should be fully un-bundled is still under 
discussion and more details can be found [5] [6]. This research models electric energy and 
ancillary services to be unbundled. 
The linkages between electric energy and ancillary services are two-folded. On the 
complementary side, ancillary services are necessary for the transfer and delivery of electric 
energy. On the competing side, the production of electric energy and ancillary services 
consumes the same resource, infinite generation capacity. 
• Contracts traded 
There are four major kinds of contracts traded on electricity markets, spot, forward, 
future and options. Forward contracts are normally traded for physical delivery, and it allows 
the scheduling of both generation facilities and transmission networks operation. The day-
ahead electricity market is an exchange forward market. Spot contracts, also known as real 
time markets, are used to allow re-scheduling and forecast errors. Future contracts are more 
often used as hedging instruments, while physical delivery is also possible. Although NYSE, 
CBOT and other exchange operated trading of future on electricity, those markets were 
suspended for lack of liquidity. Options are derivatives written on underlying assets. More 
information on spot, forward, future and options could be found in [7], 
• Trading mechanism 
A few trading mechanisms are in use now, and they include bilateral contracts, 
electric power pool, and electricity exchange. Most electricity markets employ multiple 
trading mechanisms. Bilateral contracts, also referred to Over The Counter (OTC), allow 
more flexibility, but limit the information sharing among all market players and price 
discovering. Also, bilateral contracts introduce default risk to both sides of a specific 
transaction. Forward contracts are often traded as OTC. An electricity pool does not allow a 
GENCO to make decision on unit commitment and dispatch, but solve the unit commitment 
and economic dispatch based on the "virtual production curves" submitted by GENCOs. A 
closely connected and monitored electricity pool is often the first stage of re-regulating 
6 
electric power industry and building electricity markets. An electricity exchange eliminates 
credit risk, facilitates information sharing, and increases the market liquidity. GENCOs are 
given more flexibility on the operation of generation assets. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Valuation of generation assets is a basic yet critic problem of electric power industry. 
The re-regulation of electric power industry brings two challenges to the valuation of 
generation assets, the uncertainties associated with electricity markets and the operating 
flexibilities awarded. 
The electricity markets demonstrate significant uncertainties from the viewpoint of 
valuating generation assets. Electric energy and ancillary services are traded according to 
their time-varying and location dependent values [8]. A few factors, including: 
• Non-existence of economic storage on electric power 
• Instantaneously balanced electric power supply and demand 
• Limited capability to transfer electric power 
• Limited capability to adjust demand in short notice 
contribute to significant volatilities observed on electricity markets. However, electricity 
markets also demonstrate seasonal, weekly, and daily patterns. The modeling of both the 
patterns and uncertainties of electricity markets is the first problem to be addressed for the 
purpose of valuating generation assets. 
Electricity markets also award GENCOs with flexibilities on operating generation 
assets. A profit-maximizing GENCO has full control on its generation assets, including self 
unit-commitment and dispatch. However, the flexibilities are subject to complex constraints. 
The most important generation assets' operating constraints are time constraints including 
start up time, shut down time, minimum on time, minimum down time, ramp up rate and 
ramp down rate. Startup and shut down time state that a generator cannot be started up or 
shut down immediately, which means the decision to change the operating status must be 
made before the prices on electricity and fuel are known. Minimum on and down time states 
a generator must remain on or off once being started up or shut down, which means operating 
7 
flexibilities are not always available and losses are possible. Ramp on and ramp down rate 
limits how fast a generator's output could change once on. The impacts of ramp up/down 
rates are two folded. First, it means that the full generation capacity is not always available. 
Second, it introduces lags between decision made to change the operating status of 
generation assets and the intended results. The modeling of such operating flexibilities is the 
second problem to be addressed for the purpose of valuating generation assets. 
This research is to valuate generation assets within re-regulated electricity markets, 
both in short-term and long-term. The focus is to valuate operation flexibility within 
uncertain re-regulated electricity markets. This research includes two closely related parts: 
• New models for electricity markets and generation assets: An open framework 
to incorporate engineering insights and market signals 
• Market based valuation and decision-making tools: Short-term valuation and 
Long-term planning and investment 
The modeling of re-regulated electricity markets aims to efficiently use of available 
information while still keep tractability and practicality. The valuation and decision-making 
tools aim to incorporate the operation flexibility while respecting physical constraints of 
generation assets. 
1.3 Electricity Market Model Assumed for this Work 
The electricity market framework design has been under extensive research, and 
attention has been paid to adoption to local needs such as generation technology, load 
pattern. This research assumes a market framework proposed by Gerald B. Sheblé [9], and it 
is illustrated in Figure 3. It is a short-term framework, where mid-term and long-term 
contracts are not presented. This market framework is the minimum set to illustrate this 
work while still maintaining tractability in a dissertation. The market framework includes 
forward and real time markets for electric energy and ancillary services. All markets trade on 
exchange where a double-auction mechanism is implemented. Details on modeling 
electricity markets in short-term, mid-term and long-term could be found in chapter three. 
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Market and System Operator 
Real-Time Ancillary Services 
Hourly Ancillary Services 
Forward Market 
Real-Tine Electric Energy Market 
Hourly Wholesale Electric Energy 
Forward Market 
Supply 
(GENCO A, B, C...) 
Figure 3: Minimum Set of Electricity Markets 
1.4 Achievements and Contribution of this Work 
The contribution of this work includes the modeling of electricity markets and the 
valuation of generation assets. A list of the publications based on this work is given in 
Appendix A-4. 
This research proposes to model the movements of electricity markets as partially 
oberserable Markov processes driven by underlying heterogeneous forces. An electricity 
market is modeled as a dynamic system evolving over time according to Markov processes. 
At any time interval, the electricity market can be in one state and transit to another state in 
the next time interval. This work models the states of an electricity market as partially 
observable, while each state has incomplete observations such as market-clearing price and 
quantity. The true market states are hidden from a market participant behind the incomplete 
observation. 
One application of HMM is of a more general approach and focuses on capturing the 
interaction of demand and supply forces on electricity markets. This approach extends and 
enhances the approach of regime switching. A fully constructured regime/state space is 
proposed, while the dynamics of the switching/transiting is modeled to follow Markov 
processes. This approach captures the unique features of electric power as a special 
commodity. This model is shown to be able to captures the observed clustering of 
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volatilities, price spikes and other phenomenon on electricity markets. Although this 
approach is a Mark-To-Market (MTM) approach, HMM could also apply to incorporate 
engineering insights. 
Another application of HMM is the modeling of Location Marginal Price (LMP). 
The movement of LMP is decomposed into physical and economic drivers. The physical 
drivers include transmission network topology and generation technology. The economic 
drivers include fuel prices, demand uncertainties, and profit maximization of market 
participants with incomplete information. The electricity market and power system are 
modeled to transit between different system states according to Markov chains defined by 
physical drivers. System-states-depending random processes capture the impacts of 
economics drivers. Combined together, this new approach models LMP to be generated 
from multiple random processes. This model combines the strengths of both fundamental 
economic modeling and mark-to-market stochastic modeling. The physical driver captures 
the strengths of engineering-based production cost modeling approach while the economic 
drivers captures the strength of mark-to-market approach. The decomposition provides a 
modeler the capability and tools for structural modeling of LMP. The key market drivers 
could be identified and be appropriately modeled to capture the heterogeneous nature of 
electricity. 
HMM could also be extended to short/mid/long-term modeling of electricity markets. 
In short-term, the market movements are modeled as market state transition. Mid-term 
market evolvements are captured by Model parameter changes. Long-term market 
evolvements are modeled as Model structure changes. Figure 4 illustrates a market 
movement path by linking multiple Markov models. 
This work proposes to valuate generation assets with real option analysis. Real 
option analysis provides GENCOs with a new methodology to fully valuate the operating 
flexibilities, which can be flexibilities inherent in the nature of generation assets or 
flexibilities traded on markets. A Generation Company (GENCO) is modeled to maximize 
expected profit based on the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) of electricity markets and 
newest observation on the electricity markets. This profit maximization process is modeled 
as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Problem (POMDP). A POMDP is identical to a 
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real option problem where uncertainties are structured to evolve as Markov processes. A 
formulation of POMDP is shown in Figure 5. The option value of generation assets could be 
identified and optimized. Values of perfect and imperfect information could also be provided 
by the differences under different market observability. 
Mid-Term_l 
MM_1 
Mid-Term V r 
MM r I > 
Mid-Terai_2" 
MM_2" C 
Mid-Term 2' 
MMjr 
Mid-Term_2 
MM_2 
Mid-Term 3' f 
MM_3' l > 
Mid-Term_l" 
MM_1" 
Long-Term_l 
MM_1 
11 1 
Mid-Term 2 
MM 2 
Long-Term_2 
MM_2 
M. 
Mid-Term_3" 
MM_3" 
Long-Term_3 
MM_3 
=> 
Market Movement lead to changes in parameters of Markov Model 
Market Movement lead to different Markov Model 
Figure 4: Markov Model for Short/Mid/Long-Term Modeling of Electricity Markets 
New 
Observation 
No Market 
Detection 
Belief 
State 
Detect 
Market States 
Refined 
Belief State 
Original 
Belief State 
Market 
Influence 
Market 
Influence 
No Market 
Influence 
No Market 
Influence 
Hold/Update Operation Status 
New Observation 
Updated Belief State 
Figure 5: POMDP for Generation Assets Valuation and Operation as Real Option Analysis 
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This work proposes to capture the uncertainties and fuzziness of long-term market 
forces by fuzzy numbers. Valuation of generation assets in mid-/long term is modeled as 
fuzzy real call options on synthetic spreads. The fuzzy real call options are formulated as 
Markov Decision Processes (MDP). A MDP with fuzzy features is constructed as a fuzzy 
linear programming problem. A fuzzy linear programming problem is transformed into a set 
of regular linear programming problem, and then solved. 
1.5 Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into five parts. Chapter one introduces the re-regulation 
of electric power industry and this work. Chapter two reviews the past research done on 
valuating generation assets both under regulation and re-regulation. Chapter three focuses on 
the modeling of electricity markets. Chapter four discusses the valuation of generation 
assets. Chapter five concludes this dissertation. More background information could be 
found in the Appendix. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews researches done on valuation of generation assets both under 
regulation and re-regulation. Section 2.1 reviews the past practice of electric utilities on 
operating and investing in generation assets. Section 2.2 and 2.3 reviews the latest research 
on modeling electricity markets and valuating generation assets. Section 2.4 discusses the 
long-term planning and investment of generation assets. Section 2.5 concludes this chapter 
and outlines the missing parts on both modeling electricity markets and valuating generation 
assets. 
2.1 Generation Assets Operation under Regulation 
Before Re-regulation, an electric utility was granted both the franchise to operate as a 
monopoly and the obligation to serve all demand rising in its own franchised geographic 
area. Return on investment was guaranteed and fixed at a rate, the rate of service. 
Regulatory agents reviewed the rate of service periodically to keep the return rate of the 
franchi sed utility at a reasonable level. The rate of service remained fixed during two 
reviews. Under unfavorable situations, electric utilities could appeal for the increase of rate 
of service, thus keep the return rate at a reasonable level. It is often the case that an electric 
utility being asked by regulatory agents to pass its saving of cost to customers. Under cost-
based regulation, the values of generation assets were known with certainty. 
In short-term, profit-maximization was equivalent with cost-minimization for an 
electric utility with a given fixed rate of service. Given the obligation to meet all demand 
rising in its franchi sed area, an electric utility minimizes its production cost by "unit 
commitment" and "economic dispatch". The objective of "unit commitment" and "economic 
dispatch" is to searching for the optimal set of online generation units and production levels. 
Both unit commitment and economic dispatch assume a set of installed generation assets. 
Unit commitment concerns optimizing the set of online generation units, namely which 
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generation unit to turn on/off and when. Economic dispatch concerns optimizing the 
production levels for each online generation unit, namely how much to produce for an 
already online generation unit. 
There are physical constraints imposing on unit commitment and economic dispatch. 
The constraints include 
• Time Constraints: 
o Start up time, time required to turn an offline generation unit on 
o Shut down time, time required to turn an online generator off 
o Minimum on time, time required to keep an online generation on once 
turned on 
o Minimum down time, time required to keep an offline generation off 
once shut down 
o Ramp up/down rate, speed to adjust the production level for an online 
generation unit 
• Capacity Constraints: 
o Minimum output, minimum production level for an online generation 
unit 
o Maximum output, maximum production level of an online generation 
unit 
o Unstable output interval, production level intervals where an online 
generation unit could not operate stably 
• Transmission and Security Constraints: 
o Constraints imposed by the stable operation of an electric power 
system, intervening the economic merit based generation units 
commitment and dispatching 
Under regulation, both of unit commitment and economic dispatch were performed 
centrally within utilities. 
In long-term, the incentives to minimize production cost came from the regulatory 
agents who tried to maximize social welfare and required electric utilities to minimize cost as 
a requirement for granting franchise. An electric utility minimizes its production cost of 
meeting forecasted electricity demand by planning on generation addition and transmission 
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expansion. The planning problem is extremely hard to solve for the complicated interaction 
between transmission networks and generation capacities. 
Transmission network and generation capacities are substitutes to some extend. A 
strong transmission network reduces the total generation capacity needed while generation 
capacity near load pocket removes the needs for a strong transmission network. 
Transmission network and generation capacities are also complimentary to some extend. 
The availability of hydroelectric resources helps to justify the needs to expand transmission 
network while a strong transmission network helps to realize the benefits of adding more 
efficient capital-intense generation assets located away from load centers. The dynamics of 
transmission network expansion and generation assets are tightly correlated. 
A global approach is desirable to optimize the planning of electric power systems. 
However, the complexity and high non-linearity of electric power systems planning made a 
global approach impractical. Before re-regulation, electric utilities decoupled the planning 
problem into two sub-problems, addition of generation and expansion of transmission 
networks. One sub-problem was solved by holding the other constant, and this iteration 
proceeded until a given criteria of convergence is met, as shown in Figure 6. 
Convergence? 
Production Cost 
Reliability of Equipments Demand Forecast 
Transmission Verification 
End of Planning 
Production Cost 
(Perfect Transmission) 
Figure 6: Flow Chart of Power System Planning Practice before Deregulation 
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For the generation addition sub-problem, a planner forecasts the future load and 
makes decisions on when to add new generation and the physical characteristics of new 
generation units assuming perfect transmission networks. The traditional financial tool, 
discounted cash flow (DCF), was used for selecting optimal generation addition plan. DCF 
approach was appropriate for there was no risk associated with investments in generation 
assets. After planning, new generation addition projects were passed from engineering 
department to finance department to be financed. Such a cost-based practice is in fact an 
"Engineering leads financing" approach. In fact, the cost-based regulation mechanism 
provides no economic incentives for generation addition planning. Equation 2 shows the 
WIEN Automatic System Planning Package (WASP-III) model for generation planning [9], 
Under regulation, the transmission networks were also built on the cost-based principle to 
support the reliable operation of an electric power system. This study focuses on the 
electricity generation segment, while more discussion on the expansion of transmission 
network can be found [10][11]. 
min PVCj = ^7,., - Sjt + Fjt + M jt + Oj: ] 
1=1 
Subject to : 
Energy Balance 
(l + a: )PeakLoadt *AvailableGenerationCapacity <(l + bt ) PeakLoadt 
T 
(AvailableGenerationCapacity - PeakLoad\ = ifl(AvailableGenerationCapacity - PeakLoad) 
t = l 
Reliability Constraints 
LOLP(Loss of Load Pr obabilty) < C 
Where PVC = Present valud of the total cost for a given scheme j 
I = Investment Cost 
S = Converted remnant value of investment 
F - Fuel Cost 
M = Cost of operation and Maintenance 
O = Outage Cost 
at and bt : Heuristic average weight factor 
Equation 2: WASP Generation Planning Problem 
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2.2 Modeling of Re-regulated Electricity Markets 
On re-regulated electricity markets, the demand and supply forces discover the price 
of electricity. Often, the prices of electricity diverge from the production cost of electric 
energy but reflect the time-varying and location-dependent values of electric energy. The 
modeling of electricity prices is a fundamental yet critical problem confronting all GENCOs. 
There are two approaches for modeling the dynamics of electricity prices: Mark-To-Market 
(MTM) time series approach and engineering-based production cost modeling approach. 
2.2.1 Mark-To-Market Timer Series Approach 
The MTM time series approach models electricity prices as autonomous time series, 
which could be forecasted by investigating only the historical prices. The time series 
approach for modeling electricity prices is borrowed from the modeling approaches for stock 
markets and other financial markets. It implicitly assumes weak-form market efficiency and 
stationary markets. 
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) with mean-reversion and seasonality means is 
the foundation of most models for commodities price modeling as shown in Equation 3. It 
provides a reasonable starting point for modeling electricity markets. The cyclical nature of 
electricity price movement is captured by the seasonal pattern, while the commitment and 
dispatch behavior of GENCOs are represented with mean-reversion. GBM with its 
modifications have been applied to valuate both transmission and generation assets 
[12][13][14][15][16][17], 
d ( l n P E  ) =  m E ( l n P , E  -  m f  ) d t  +  s E d W l E  
W h e r e  m E  :  m e a n  -  r e v e r s i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  
s E  :  v o l a t i l i t y  
m f  :  s e a s o n a l  p a t t e r n  
W t E  : W e i n e r  P r o c e s s  
Equation 3: Mean Reversion GBM 
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Many assumptions employed in modeling the behaviors of stock markets should be 
scrutinized before being applied to electricity markets. The mean-reversion feature of 
electricity price movements has been tested, and it was found that electricity prices short-
term movement does not show mean-reversion [4], GBM model also assumes that the prices 
for electricity follow lognormal distributions. Such an assumption is not valid for electricity 
markets. It is shown that electricity prices follows distributions with fat tails compared to 
normal distribution. Other features observed on electricity prices movements include 
extreme volatilities (100%-500% and higher), clustered price spikes, stochastic volatilities 
and others. 
Improvements on the GBM include regime switching [18][19], jump-diffusion 
processes, General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) and others [20]. 
Regime switching states that there are unobserved market regimes following stochastic 
processes underlying the observed price movements. Often, electricity markets are 
categorized into stable regime with less volatility and unstable regimes with extreme 
volatility. For each regime, an individual econometric model is proposed and fitted with 
historical data. Jump-diffusion assumes that the movements of electricity prices are not 
necessarily continuous. The movements of electricity prices are modeled to include: 
diffusion and jumps. Often, Poisson distributions are employed to model the frequency of 
price jumps and the sizes of jumps. It is also proposed to model volatility to be dependent on 
other factors such as time, price levels among others. General Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) are one implementation of volatility surfaces. GARCH aims to 
capture the clustering of volatility on electricity markets. 
Although complex models are more capable to capture the observed features of 
electricity price movements, complicated models also find difficulties in parameters 
estimation and suffer over-fitting problems in econometric sense. 
The over-fitting problem is mainly due to the lack of historical data and non-
stationary nature of electricity markets. The electricity markets posses short history, and 
keep evolving. Both the regulators and market participants are in the transition of 
restructuring. Their behaviors are experiencing significant evolvements. This not only limits 
18 
the availability of market historical data, but also raises the problem of choosing appropriate 
time windows for parameter estimation. 
Another problem associated with stationary electricity market assumption is the 
unstable correlation between electricity prices at different transmission buses, most 
importantly, the cross-correlation between electricity prices and prices on fuels. The 
investigation of such correlation is of importance for valuing generation and transmission 
assets. 
Another limiting and questionable assumption is that all the samples observed are 
drawn from the same distribution. This implies stationary and integrated markets driven by 
the same physical and economic drivers. The limited transfer capability of transmission 
network segments electricity markets into isolated zones therefore renders electric energy 
within different zones as heterogeneous commodities. 
The time series approach implicitly assumes weak-form market efficiency for 
electricity markets, and only employs historical market data. The modeling of imperfect 
electricity markets driven by heterogeneous physical and economic drivers requires a 
detailed model for the fundamental drivers. The incorporation of fundamental drivers also 
addresses the over-fitting problem, unstable correlation and other problems faced by mark-to-
market approach. 
2.2.2 Engineering-Base Production Cost Modeling Approach 
The electricity price movement could also be modeled using fundamental 
engineering-based approaches such as production cost modeling. Production cost modeling 
approximates the Location Marginal Price (LMP) algorithms used by ISO/RTOs as shown in 
Figure 7. This approach requires tremendous input data including detailed presentation of 
transmission networks, all generation units, demand on electric power, costs and bidding 
behaviors of all GENCOs among others. 
The demand for electricity is forecasted utilizing techniques traditional applied by 
utilities. With forecasted electric load demand and fuel cost, the marginal generation units 
are identified based on unit commitment and economic dispatch. Power flow and 
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contingency analysis identify the binding transmission constraints. The most significant 
feature of production cost modeling is the incorporation of the detailed representation of 
transmission systems. Inclusion of transmission systems helps to identify the congested 
transmission paths, therefore the contribution factors to calculate LMP [21]. 
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Figure 7 : LMP Mechanism 
Production cost modeling captures the physical drivers of electricity markets and the 
cost structures of electricity markets. The incorporation of physical drivers helps explaining 
the correlation between LMPs, prices of fuels, and demand levels. However, the data and 
computation burden of simulating electric power systems limits the capability of production 
cost modeling to capture the uncertainties of market drivers. This severely limits the 
potential to incorporate production cost modeling into existing valuation and risk 
management systems. 
Another limiting assumption of production cost modeling is that GENCOs bid at their 
variable cost, including the fuel cost, O&M cost and other variable costs. The profit-
maximizing operation of a GENCO is based on its expectation for markets. The GENCOs' 
expectations for markets are based on incomplete information about the markets, which often 
lead not to bid at the its producing marginal cost. Detailed modeling of GENCOs' 
competition behavior is prohibitive expensive, if possible. 
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Although production cost modeling incorporates public information such as fuel 
prices, demand forecast and parameters for generators and transmission systems, it fails to 
utilize historical market data. The ignorance of historical market data severely limits the 
application of production cost modeling to contract valuation, risk management and other 
Mark to Market (MTM) activities. From the perspective of valuating generation assets, the 
production cost modeling approaches fails to provide support for the application of real 
option analysis. 
A new modeling approaches for valuating generation assets within re-regulated 
electricity markets is needed. Such a model should incorporate both engineering and market 
insights. The model should be designed to meet the requirements of capturing the operation 
flexibility of generation assets using real option analysis. This work proposes a hybrid model 
to be discussed in Chapter three. 
2.3 Short-Term Generation Assets Valuation 
2.3.1. Application of Financial Option Theory 
Re-regulation of electric power industry removes the obligation for GENCOs to 
serve, but awards GENCOs the flexibility to operate their generation assets. Traditional 
Discount Cash Flow (DCF) methods, such as Net Present Value (NPV), ignore the inherent 
flexibilities in operating generation assets, which renders them fundamentally flawed and 
under-valuate generation assets [22] [23]. 
This section reviews the application of financial option analysis in valuating 
generation assets. More details on the theory of financial options could be found in [7]. 
Financial option theory models generation assets as call options on spark spread [12] [13]. A 
spark spread is defined as the electricity price less the product of the generator heat rate and 
fuel price. Since this option involves two commodities with different market prices, its value 
depends on both prices and can be written as follows: 
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Value_of_Power_Plant = max(PE - HeatRate* PF ,0) 
HeatRate = ElectricityGenerated / UnitFuel 
Equation 4: Call Option on Spark Spread 
The financial option modeling captures the operating flexibilities of generation assets. 
However, modeling generation assets as pure financial assets leads to over valuation. The 
reason for over-valuation is that the spark spread option model ignores many features of real 
assets, such as physical constraints, market structure, and price movement. The direct impact 
of ignoring those features is that the option's value is forced to be non-negative by modeling, 
and that means the owner of such an asset will never loses money. Real option theory has 
been proposed to valuate generation assets, and the next section reviews researches on the 
application of real option analysis. 
2.3.2 Application of Real Option Analysis 
Real option analysis has been under intensive research and has seen successful 
applications in different industries such as oil, pharmacy, and hi-tech industries [22][23], 
Real option analysis has been shown to give better results than DCF approach, especially 
when significant uncertainties and operation flexibility present. Real option analysis has 
seen more and more applications on the valuation of generation assets because it explicitly 
accounts for the flexibility in operating generation assets [14][15][16][17]. Real option 
provides GENCOs with an effective methodology to fully valuate the operating flexibilities, 
which can be flexibility inherent in the nature of generation assets or flexibilities traded on 
markets. 
Real option analysis' superior performance for modeling and valuating uncertainties 
comes from its inheritance of financial option theory. Real option analysis overcomes the 
over-value drawback of modeling generation assets using financial options by incorporating 
operation constraints of generation assets. 
The physical constraints of generation assets include time and capacity constraints. 
The capacity constraints state the volume of call option available to the owner of a generation 
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asset. Startup and shut down time state that a generator cannot be started up or shut down 
immediately, which means the decision to exercise a spark spread call option must be made 
before the prices on electricity and fuel are observed. Minimum on and down time states a 
generator must remain on or off once being started up or shut down, which means spark 
spread options are not always available and losses are possible. Ramp on rate limits the 
increase of a generator's output during start up, while ramp down rate limits the capability 
for a generator to decrease its output, both mean that a spark option is not always available 
for the full generation capacity. 
There are arguments on the impact of physical constraints on values of generation 
assets, especially the impacts of ramp up and ramp down constraints. Deng states that start 
up cost, ramp-up time and output dependent heat rate has less impact on relatively efficient 
power plants like gas-fired power plants, thus could be ignored [14]. Tseng investigated the 
ramp constraint of power plants, and concluded that ramp constraints have impact on thermal 
power plants by reducing fuel economy, heat-electricity transformation efficiency and 
available generation capacity, which could be sold into spinning reserve markets as ancillary 
services [24]. 
Real option analysis should also recognize the behavioral differences between 
financial instruments and physical commodities. This work proposes to incorporate not only 
the physical constraints on operating generation assets but also their impacts on the 
electricity market movements. This research proposes an integrated modeling and valuating 
framework to fully employ the strength of real option analysis. 
2.4 Investment on Generation Assets 
Prior to re-regulation, generation planning or generation expansion aimed to lower 
production cost while maintain generation reserve margin no lower than the reliability 
threshold. Re-regulation replaces the centralized regulated utilities generation planning with 
re-regulated electricity market mechanisms monitored by ISO/RTO. 
Krasenbrink et al. pointed out that planning tools that are able to support an integrated 
planning of power generation and trading is needed Error! Reference source not found.. 
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Integrated resource planning has been extended from regulation environment to re-
regulation, and it aims at application from a social welfare perspective assumed perfect 
information [26] [27]. Multiple criteria decision-making is also extended to competitive 
electricity markets with modified objective or constraints such as environment risks and 
utilizes multiple scenarios for optimization [28]. While some planning models assume price-
taker behavior, game theory has been applied to capture the interaction between GENCOs, 
and one-round Coumot model was deployed [29]. Genetic Algorithm has been applied based 
on game theory approach, and improved the Coumot model by allowing agents to learn from 
each other and introduced some structure to the behavior of a GENCO [30]. The correlation 
of fuel market and electricity market has been explored by integrated planning for the natural 
gas and electricity systems [31]. 
Past researches focuses more on generation planning from a system-wide perspective 
and discusses the aggregated generation resources adequacy. Deng compared the valuation 
of generation assets based on real option analysis with the market transaction amounts on 
generation assets [14]. The simple assumption that multiplying short-term values could 
valuate long-term generation investment does not hold in electricity markets. The most-
recent over-build and mothballing in generation capacity in several North America electricity 
markets suggests that a better tool for valuating investments in generation assets is needed. 
This planning tool should incorporate the dynamics of generation reserve margin and the 
dynamics of a specific generation asset' competition position within generation stack. 
2.5 Missing Parts from Past Research 
Applying real option analysis to valuate generation assets explicitly take the operation 
flexibility into consideration and has been shown to provide valuable insights. However, 
several features are missing from past research. The missing features have different impacts 
on the values of generation assets. In general, ignoring any forces limiting the operation 
flexibilities of generation facilities or surpassing uncertainties results in over-value while 
ignoring any forces enhancing the operation flexibilities or boost uncertainties results in 
24 
under-value. The reason is that value is created when uncertainties presents with flexibilities, 
which composes an option. 
Past researches failed to incorporate information efficiently. The MTM approach 
assumes a static statistical structure and utilizes only historical market data, which were 
generated by fast evolving electricity markets. The engineering based production cost 
modeling approach ignores the significant market volatilities observed and assumes market 
equilibrium. 
One feature missing from past research is the ignoring of market structure of an 
electricity market. Re-regulated electricity markets do not share the same feature with 
financial instruments markets. The differences in markets structure include market players' 
composition, trading liquidity, production, transportation and storage technologies among 
others. The most important feature of electricity market structure is the ownership of 
generation capacities. The dynamic unit commitment of electric power system in fact leads 
to time-varying generation capacity ownership compositions. The dynamics of generation 
capacity ownership segments electricity markets into peak and non-peak time intervals. The 
instantaneous balance between electric energy supply and demand, limited transfer 
capabilities of transmission networks and non-existence of large-scale economic storage of 
electric energy segment electricity markets into different zones. The physically 
homogeneous electric energy is financially heterogeneous, demonstrating time-varying and 
location-dependent values. 
Electricity markets' architectures are also ignored in past researches. Although the 
electric energy is the staple of electricity markets, there are many other markets such as 
ancillary services, capacity, emission and others. Most of the services could be provided 
from the every same generation assets as of electric energy. A GENCO might have the 
operating flexibility to choose which sub-markets to supply, optimizes the operation of its 
generation assets. 
Past researches simplify the options available to a GENCO by assuming a GENCO to 
be a price-taker on a single forward electric energy market and a GENCO makes its decision 
solely based on the information on electric energy markets. The operation of generation 
assets becomes passively responding to the only signal sent from a single electric energy 
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market. However, each GENCO actively optimizes its portfolio including both financial and 
physical assets. A valuation approach ignoring the active portfolio management of 
generation assets leads to under-valuation. 
Past research fails to model the market evolution, which link short-term market 
models into long-term markets models. The observed generation assets building heat and 
cold off are partly due to the lack of a long-term risk share mechanism and decision-making 
support tools for GENCOs. An appropriate investment tool should allow the modelers to 
incorporate subject judgments for the long-term market forecast is highly uncertain so that 
objective forecast is of lower quantity. 
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Chapter 3: Modeling of Electricity Markets 
This chapter begins with analyzing the electricity markets and the features observed 
on the electricity price movements. The deficiencies of past research and needs on modeling 
electricity markets are also identified in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 introduces the concept of 
Hidden Market Model (HMM). Section 3.3 proposes to model a general electricity market 
with HMM. Section 3.4 introduces the concept of Location Marginal Price (LMP). Section 
3.5 extends HMM to a special application, the modeling of LMP. Section 3.6 proposes to 
extend the short-term model discussed into mid-term and long-term modeling of electricity 
markets. Fuzzy sets and numbers are employed to capture the extreme uncertainties 
associated with mid/long-term electricity markets movements. 
3.1 Electricity Markets as Special Commodity Markets 
As commodity markets, electricity markets' structures and architectures are 
significantly different with financial markets. The market structure and architecture are of 
critical importance of understanding and modeling electricity markets' movements. Chapter 
one discusses electricity markets' structure and architecture. While chapter one focuses more 
on the composition of electricity markets, this section focuses on the dynamics of electricity 
markets. 
The physically homogeneous electric energy is heterogeneous temporally and 
spatially. One significant feature of electricity markets is the complicated seasonality, 
showing pattern in different time horizons. Three factors contribute to the yearly, weekly, 
and daily patterns observed on electricity markets: 
• The seasonality of demand for electric energy 
• The indispensable nature of electric energy as a commodity 
• The technical constraints on supplying and storing electric energy 
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Based on the nature of demand and supply of electric energy, a regional electricity 
market can be segmented into base-load, intermediate-load and peak-load sub-markets shown 
in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Temporally Segments of Electricity Markets 
Base-load markets, intermediate-load markets and peak-load markets compose cyclic 
electricity markets movements as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Dynamics of Base, Intermediate and Peak Load 
Each sub-market has different market players. For base-load electricity markets, the 
key suppliers are base-load generators that utilize similar technology to achieve efficiency of 
producing electricity. Most often, the base generators are nuclear generators, combined cycle 
combustion turbine units burning natural gas, and ultra-temperature and pressure coal 
burning generators with generation capacity ranging from 500MW to 1000MW and more. 
Base generators in general are slow units in the sense of starting up/shutting down/ramping 
up/down. The transmission network is less stressed during base-load periods, thus the base-
load electricity market is geographically more spanned. 
Peak-load generators share similar technology to achieve fast start up and shut down 
capability. Most often, the peak generators are natural gas generators with capacity ranging 
from 50MW to 200+ MW. Peak generation units in general are less efficient than base 
generators, but takes much less time to change their operating statuses. The transmission 
network is more stressed during peak-load periods, thus the network is more easily congested 
during peak-load periods. 
Intermediate generators' efficiency and speed of changing operating statuses are 
between based generators and peak generators. The same is true of the transmission 
networks during intermediate load period. 
Renewable generators could not easily be categorized based on the load they serve. 
The reason is that most renewable generators have little control on their raw energy sources. 
Such generators include wind generators, run-of-the-river hydro generation units, solar 
generators and earth-thermal generators. One exception is the hydro generators with 
reservoirs, which enables the hydro generation unit the operating flexibility to supply electric 
energy. With further development of renewable energy, the electricity markets movements 
expect significant changes. 
Electricity demand could be categorized into industry, commercial and residential 
customers based on the objectives and technologies of electricity consumption. Base demand 
includes invariant parts of all three-load groups, which depends mainly on population size 
and macroeconomic trend. Peak electric demand is due to commercial and residential 
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customers for heating/cooling and therefore highly correlated with weather. Intermediate 
electric load are often referred to as the transition between base and peak load periods. 
The difference in the supply and demand forces in base-load, intermediate load and 
peak-load electricity markets suggests different market participants, structures and behaviors. 
Physical system drivers also play significant roles in driving electricity markets. During peak 
electric load period, the infinite-transfer capability of electric power transmission network 
segments an integrated electricity market into several zones with heterogeneous markets 
structure. The heterogeneous economic and physic drivers lead to different market prices 
movements. 
Past researches ignores the heterogeneousity and dynamics of electricity markets, 
assuming a single stationary electricity market driven by homogeneous drivers. This work 
aims to capture the dynamics of market structure, both temporally and spatially. 
This work proposes to model electricity markets as dynamics systems. The system is 
defined by a closed system states space. The transition is approximated with Markov 
processes, driven by physical and economic drivers. Markov processes capture the dynamics 
of both the physical and economic drivers. 
Physical constraints of generation units link the generation production level of one 
hour to a previous hour. The aggregated online generation capacity at the next time interval 
could be modeled as dependent on the current level of online generation capacity and the unit 
commitment and dispatch decisions of GENCOs. Elliott models the operation state of 
generators with Markov chain model and analyses the prices jump at Alberta electricity 
market [32]. Dynamics of electric power load could also be approximated by Markov 
process[33]. 
Markov processes are also consistent with weak-form market efficiency, which is 
often assumed by Mark-to-Market approach. Price on Electricity has been modeled to follow 
Geometric Brownian motion, which is a Markov process. Some researchers have proposed 
to divide the movement of price on electricity into different regimes, where each regime has 
its own stochastic model for price movement. [33] [35] The switching between different 
regimes is modeled as a Markov chain. C. C. Liu modeled a GENCO's bidding strategy 
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using Markov chain model, where a GENCO bids low, middle or high with its state transit 
following a Markov chain model [36]. 
3.2 Hidden Markov Model 
3.2.1 General Markov Model 
A stochastic process is defined to be an indexed collection of random variables {X}, 
where index runs though a given set {T}. If a stochastic process has the Markovian property, 
it is qualified to be a Markov chain or Markov process [37]. A Markov chain or Markov 
process consists of a given set of states and the transition matrix as shown Equation 5. 
Markov Chain Defintion 
Transition Probability Matrix P, (stationary, time - varing,...) 
States, (Limited, Unlimited...) 
Time,t = 0 Time,t = l Time,t=T — l Time,t = N 
State _ 1 State _ 1 State „ 1 State _ 1 
State 2 n State 2 State 2 State 2 
— pi=o — pi=i — pt=r~i — 
State _ N -1 State _ N — 1 State _ N -1 State _ N -1 
State _ N State _N State _ N State _N 
Equation 5: Definition of Markov Processes 
The Markovian property says that the conditional probability of any future event, 
given any past event, and the present state, is independent of the past event and depends only 
on the present state, as shown in Equation 6. 
Markovian Property 
P { X I =  i  =  j  | X0 = k 0 , X j  =  k l , . . . X l  =  / }  =  P { X t = i  =  j  |  X t  =  / }  
f o r  a n y  t = 0 , l  . .  a n d  e v e r y  s e q u e n c e  i ,  j ,  k 0 , k r . . .  
Equation 6: Markovian Properties 
31 
Markov chain models have also been applied in financial area, namely approximation 
of the distribution and movement of underlying asset value in numerical methods on pricing 
derivatives. Compared with multinomial trees, Markov chain model is shown to more 
flexible and efficient [38]. For options pricing with binomial trees, the length of a time step 
and the number of asset prices generated by the tree are simultaneously determined for a 
particular maturity. For the Markov chain method, the length of a time step and the number 
of discrete asset prices are independently set. Markov chain's closed set of system states 
reduces the discrete prices need to be generated, thus increases efficiency. While binomial 
tree shows a typical jagged convergence pattern, Markov chain method converges more 
smoothly and faster. 
3.2.2 Hidden Markov Model 
3.2.2.1 Basics of Hidden Markov Model 
If the states of a Markov chain are not fully observable, we have Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM). A pair of stochastic processes (X; Y) is a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) if 
X (the state process) is a Markov process and Y (the observable process) is an incomplete 
observation of X [39]. The observation can be deterministic or probabilistic and the 
observable can be a state or a state transition. Mathematically, HMM is a doubly embedded 
stochastic process with an underlying stochastic process that is not observable, but can only 
be observed through another set of stochastic processes that produce the sequence of 
observations. Equation 7 defines a HMM with discrete observable variables. 
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Two Model Parameters : 
N (Number of States) 
M (Number of distinct observation symbols per state) 
State Transition Probability Matrix A 
Observation Symbol Distribution given a State B 
Initial State Distribution, p 
A : a 0 =  P [ q t + 1  =  S j  |  q ,  =  S f ] , l  <  i ,  j < N  
B  :  b - ( k )  =  P [ v k  a t  t \ q t  =  5 ; . ] , 1 <  j < N , l < k < M  
i  =  p [ q {  = S i ] , l < i < N  
Equation 7: Hidden Markov Model 
Several features of HMM make it a good candidate for theoretical analysis. First, 
HMM has a very rich mathematical structure such that a sequence of HMMs of increasing 
size can approximate any ergodic stochastic process in the weak and cross entropy sense 
[40]. The second merit of HMM is its strength to explain extreme variations in the observed 
process based on a postulated hidden process. In particular, a HMM attributes this over-
dispersion to the key model feature that observations come from one of several different 
marginal distributions, each associated with a different latent state. An HMM is capable to 
capture the over-dispersion in the observed electricity market data by showing that the 
markets are transiting among different states. The third merit is that there are very efficient 
algorithms to solve (Forward-Backward Method) HMM. More details on HMM can be 
found in references [41] [42] [43] [44], Finally, HMM can be extended to many special cases, 
which have potential application in modeling electricity markets. 
3.2.2.2 Extensions of Hidden Markov Model 
The understanding of HMM has advanced considerably since the realization that 
HMM is a kind of Bayesian Networks (BN), more specifically a special case of Dynamic 
Bayesian Network (DBN) [43]. HMM can be extended to more complex and interesting 
models such as FHMM, Tree-Structured HMM, and Switching State Space model. General 
solutions to the problems of parameters learning, and model selection have been under 
33 
intensive research and efficient algorithms are available for some special cases. The 
following section discusses Bayesian Networks, Dynamic Bayesian Networks, and general 
solutions to both BN, DBN and their extension to HMMs. 
A Bayesian network is a graphical model for representing conditional independencies 
between a set of random variables, as shown in Figure 10. A Bayesian Network, also known 
as belief network, probabilistic graphical mode or probabilistic independence network is a 
marriage between probability theory and graph theory. It provides a natural tool for dealing 
with two problems that occur throughout applied mathematics and engineering, uncertainty 
and complexity. 
Fundamental to the idea of a graphical model is the notion of modularity; a complex 
system is built by combining simpler parts. Probability theory provides the glue to integrate 
different parts, ensuring that the system as a whole is consistent, and providing ways to 
interface models to data. The graph models provide both an intuitively interface to modelers 
and a data structure that lends itself naturally to the design of efficient general-purpose 
algorithms. Many of the classical multivariate probabilistic systems studied in fields such as 
statistics, systems engineering, information theory, pattern recognition and statistical 
mechanics are special cases of the general graphical model formalism, such as mixture 
models, factor analysis, Hidden Markov models, and Kalman filters. The graphical model 
framework provides a way to view all of these systems as instances of a common underlying 
formalism. This view enables to apply specialized techniques, which have been developed in 
one field, to be transferred between research communities and exploited more widely. 
Figure 10: Bayesian Network 
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HMM falls in a subclass of Bayesian Networks known as Dynamic Bayesian 
Networks, which are simply Bayesian Networks for modeling time series data. In time series 
modeling, the assumption that an event can cause another event in the future, but not vice-
versa, simplifies the design of the Bayesian network: directed arcs should flow forward in 
time. Another very well known model in this class is the Linear-Gaussian State-Space 
model, also known as the Kalman filter, which can be thought of as the continuous-state 
version of HMM. What makes HMM and State-Space Models (SSM) special is that their 
hidden state spaces are closed under their respective state transition probabilities and output 
models. This closed property of HMM and SSM makes inference and learning particularly 
simple and appealing in these models, such as Maximum Likelihood (ML) in HMM and 
Kalman filtering in SSM. However, those methods can only crudely approximate Bayesian 
learning, and will perform catastrophically when data is scarce and/or the model is complex. 
• Factorial Hidden Markov Models (FHMM) 
An HMM is essentially a mixture model, encoding information about the history of a 
time series in the value of a single multinomial variable, the hidden system state. This 
multinomial assumption allows an efficient parameter estimation algorithm to be derived, the 
Baum-Welch or EM algorithm. However, it also severely limits the representation capacity 
of an HMM. For example, to represent 30 bits of information about the history of a time 
series, an HMM would need 230 distinct states. On the other hand, an HMM with a 
distributed state representation could achieve the same task with 30 binary variables. 
The distributed state representation incorporates flexibility into HMM, and increases 
the modeling power. First, such representation decomposes the state space into features that 
naturally decouple the dynamics of the process generating the time series. In this study, 
demand and supply on electricity determine the market clearing price and quantity together. 
Although the relationship between demand and supply can be modeled as system states such 
as under-supply, equilibrium, over-supply; a more natural approach is to model the demand 
and supply sides as distributed system states. Also, the distributed representation facilitates 
the incorporation of ancillary services into an electricity market model. 
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Secondly, distributed state representations simplify the task of modeling time series 
generated by the interaction of multiple independent process. In this study, it allows 
modeling market architectures into the market model by explicitly defining how the 
observations depend on incompletely observable states. Ghahramani defines HMMs with 
distributed state as Factorial Hidden Markov Models (FHMM), and Figure 11 compares 
HMM with FHMM [42]. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 11: Comparison between HMM and FHMM, (a) HMM (b) FHMM 
S is defined as hidden system state while Y is defined as observation or emission 
• Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) 
When HMM is extended to FHMM, exact algorithms for parameter learning and 
model selection become intractable and new approximate algorithms are based on general 
solutions to Dynamic Bayesian Networks. Modeling FHMM as DBN provides advantages 
because that a DBN may have exponentially fewer parameters than corresponding FHMM 
thus inference in a DBN may be exponentially faster than in the corresponding FHMM. For 
a FHMM with D chains, each with K values, the numbers of parameters to define the 
probability P(X, \ XT_, ) are of 0(KM ) for FHMM and 0(DK2 ) for DBN. The 
computational complexity of exact inference is of 0(TK2 D  )  for FHMM and 0(TDKD + I  )  for 
DBN. Since DBN is more general than FHMM, its inference algorithms can also be applied 
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to other variants of HMM. In Figure 12, Input-Output HMM might be of interest if the 
demand for electricity is modeled as input to an electricity markets. This is possible and 
interesting because that ISO normally forecast and announce electricity demand to the public, 
and currently demand for electricity has no short-term self-price elasticity [45]. 
HMM MixGauss HMM AR-HMM 
IO-HMM 
Figure 12: Variants Implantations of DBN 
Shaded shapes are observable variables while empty shapes are hidden states 
• Tree-Structured HMM, Switching State-Space Models and Other Extensions 
Other extensions of HMM include Tree-Structured HMM, Switching State-Space 
Models, and they have potential applications in modeling electricity markets. In FHMM, the 
state variables at the same time slice are assumed to be independent given the state variables 
at the previous time slice. This assumption can be relaxed in many ways by introducing 
coupling between the state variables in a single time slice. In modeling electricity markets, 
the demand for ancillary services could be modeled as depending on demand on electric 
energy. Figure 13 illustrates the structure of a Tree-Structured HMM, where X defines input, 
S defines hidden states, and Y defines output. The architecture can be interpreted as a 
probabilistic decision tree with Markovian dynamics linking the decision variables, which 
could be the temporal constraints for demand and supply on electricity. 
37 
Figure 13: Tree-Structured HMM 
At any time interval, the input X, which is the forecasted demand for electricity by 
ISO, enters the electricity market model. The demand for electric energy Sa> also 
determines the demand for ancillary services S<2>, while the supplied generation capacity 
S<3> can be used to meet demand for electric energy, ancillary service, or both. 
The modeling of an electricity market should allow the states to be continuous 
variables, which is more natural for demand on electricity. This can be achieved by 
extending HMM to Switching State-Space Model (SSSM). Figure 14 illustrates the structure 
of SSSM. In SSSM, the observations Y is modeled using a hidden state space comprising M 
real-valued state vectors Xs and state discrete state vector S. In modeling electricity markets, 
X could be real-valued demand and supply capacities on electricity, while S defines how the 
market prices Y depends on X. For example, S could be a binary state variable defines 
whether the transmission networks are congested or not. 
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Figure 14: Switching State Space Model 
3.2.2.3 HMM Estimation and Numerical Problems 
Algorithms to estimate FHMM and other extensions are only approximations to the 
exact algorithm for tractability. Two main approaches are sampling methods and variation 
methods. The dominant sampling method is Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC), which 
allows us to draw samples from a Markov chain instead of from the posterior distribution 
P(X | Y). The Markov chain will be updated and is guaranteed to converge to the posterior 
probabilities of the states given observations as long as none of the probabilities in the model 
is exactly zero. The simplest case of MCMC is Gibbs sampling method, which is 
implemented by Ghahramani [42]. The variation methods essentially decouple all the nodes 
in DBN, and introduce a new parameter, called a variation parameter for each node, and 
iteratively update those parameters so as to minimize the cross-entropy (KL distance) 
between the approximate and true probability distributions. Updating the variation 
parameters becomes a proxy for inference and produces a lower bound on the likelihood. 
Other numerical problems associated with FHMM and DBN include overfitting and 
model selection. The following section discusses those two subjects briefly and more details 
could be found [39]. Overfitting refers to the scenario where the estimated model fits the 
training set very well but generalizes poorly to a test set chosen from the same data 
distribution. It is most prevalent when the training set is small relative to the complexity of 
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the model and there is nothing in the maximum likelihood fitting procedure itself can avoid 
it. Three approaches are available now, cross-validation, regularization, and Bayesian 
integral. Model selection, or learning model structure, is closely related problem of picking a 
particular structure amongst several alternatives. For example, a modeler need to choose 
either a regular HMM or extension to HMM or parameters such as the number of hidden 
states in a model before parameter estimation. Sometimes, the detection of missing hidden 
system states can be critical to the performance of a model. There is nothing in ML 
parameters fitting that does this automatically. There are some algorithms for model 
selection, but requires human being's intervention. Both overfitting and model selection 
require the judgments of a modeler, where the fitness of a model not only depends on its 
statistical or computational performance but more importantly, its explanation power for the 
observation based reasonable logics. Those subjects will be discussed when it presents itself 
in this study. 
3.2.2.4 Markov Decision Process and Partially Observable Markov Decision Process 
When the decision-maker could have impacts on the state transition, Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM) evolves into Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). For a 
HMM, a decision-maker is a "state taker", who observes and forecasts the state transition and 
make decision based on its perception. A winder generator is most often a state taker 
confronting a HMM. For a POMDP, a decision-maker actually has some control over the 
transition of states, thus a "state maker". If an electricity market is only partially observable, 
a hydro electricity station with reservoir, where the remaining water level is under control of 
a GENCO, could be modeled using POMDP. Table 2 illustrates the concepts of Markov 
Process, MDP, HMM and POMDP. 
Table 2: Markov Process, MDP, HMM and POMDP 
Markov Model 
States Transition Controllable 
NO YES 
States YES Markov Chain MDP 
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Observable NO HMM POMDP 
The following discusses the difference between Markov Decision Process (MDP) 
with POMDP, and the solution to POMDP. In an MDP, the state of the world is completely 
observable. A policy is a mapping from the set of states, which are oberservable, to the set of 
actions. If both sets are assumed to be finite, the number of possible mappings is also finite. 
An optimal policy can be found by conducting search over this finite set of mappings. In a 
POMDP, on the other hand, the observations do not provide sufficient information about 
system states. Information from previous steps need to be taken into consideration. All such 
information can be summarized by a probability distribution over the set of states if 
Markovian property exists. In the literature, this probability distribution is often referred to 
as a belief state. The belief space is defined to be the set of all possible belief states. It is a 
continuous space although the world has only a finite number of states. In a POMDP, a 
policy is a mapping from the belief space to the set of actions. This definition seems similar 
to a policy in the MDP context. However, the continuum of the belief space poses a 
challenge from the computational perspective because the number of mappings can be 
uncountably many. To find an optimal policy for a POMDP, one has to conduct search over 
this space. This fundamental difference makes solving POMDPs drastically more difficult 
than solving MDPs. 
Closely related to the concept of a policy is the concept of a value function, which is a 
mapping from belief states to real numbers. Each feasible policy has an associated value 
function and the better the policy, the better its value function. On the other hand, one can 
construct a policy given a value function and the better the value function, the better the 
policy constructed. This leads to another strategy to solve a POMDP, i.e., to conduct search 
in a value function space. Value iteration does exactly this: it improves value functions in an 
iterative fashion. Each iteration is referred to as dynamic-programming (DP) update. A DP 
update computes a new value function over the entire belief space from the current one. 
Value iteration stops when the current value function is sufficiently close to the optimal. 
Since each iteration needs to consider uncountably many belief states, DP updates are 
expensive. Moreover, value iteration needs to conduct many steps of DP updates before it 
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can find a near optimal value function. These two factors make value iteration very 
inefficient. This has led to the development of new exact algorithms to efficiently compute 
optimal solutions, and various approximation approaches. 
A POMDP can be solved exactly or approximately by value iteration algorithm [45], 
enumeration algorithm [46], one-pass algorithm [47], linear support algorithm [48], witness 
algorithm [49], incremental pruning algorithm [51], and other algorithms. All the algorithms 
are based on dynamic programming. Special features of electricity markets and geneation 
assets valuation could be utilized to improve the performance of solving a POMDP. 
3.3 Modeling Electricity Markets with HMM 
This section proposes to model the movements of electricity markets as HMM driven 
by underlying economic forces. An electricity market is modeled as a dynamic system 
evolving over time according to Markov processes. At any time interval, the electricity 
market can be in one state and transit to another state in the next time interval. The states of 
an electricity market are modeled as partially observable, while each state has incomplete 
observations such as market-clearing price and quantity. The true market states are hidden 
from a market participant behind the incomplete observation. HMM is of a more 
fundamental approach and focuses on capturing the interaction of supply and demand forces 
on electricity markets. An example is given to apply HMM to historical data from New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO). 
The simpleast form of HMM is regime switching. Regime switching states that there 
are unobserved market regimes following Markov processes underlying the observed price 
movements. Often, electricity markets are categorized into stable regime with less volatility 
and unstable regimes with extreme volatility. For each regime, an individual econometric 
model is proposed and fitted with historical data. Figure 15 Illustrates a regime switching 
diagram. 
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Figure 15: Regime-Switching, the Simplest HMM 
The simplest HMM shown in Figure 15 encodes information of a time series with the 
value of a single multinomial variable, the hidden system state. HMM could be extended to 
FHMM, which is capable to decompose market drivers such as demand and supply forces. 
This feature allows incorporating market architecture into the market model by explicitly 
defining how the observations depend on incomplete observable states. An HMM with 
distributed states is defined as a Factorial Hidden Markov Model (FHMM), shown in Figure 
16. The electricity markets states are defined by three factors, demand on electric energy, 
demand on ancillary services and online generation capacity. Demand on ancillary service is 
further modeled to be dependent on demand on electric energy. This model decomposes 
markets into different factors/drivers, and imposes more structural features. 
Prices Prices 
Electric Energy 
Demand Level 
Ancillary Services 
Demand Level 
Electric Energy 
Demand Level 
Online Generation 
Capacity 
Ancillary Services 
Demand Level 
Online Generation 
Capacity 
Figure 16: FHMM for Electricity Markets 
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In FHMM, the state variables at a time interval are assumed to be dependent only on 
the corresponding state variables at the previous time interval. This assumption can be 
relaxed by introducing coupling between the state variables in different time intervals. Tree-
Structured HMM (TSHMM) allows modeling of the interdependence between state variables 
of different time intervals. The TSHMM, shown in Figure 17, models the supplied 
generation capacities at time T+l to be dependent on the demand on electricity at time T. 
This feature captures mean-reversion, which is the results of behaviors of generation 
companies to turn on more generators when higher prices are expected. 
Prices Prices 
Ancillary Services 
Demand Level 
Electric Energy 
Demand Level 
Electric Energy 
Demand Level 
Online Generation 
Capacity 
Ancillary Services 
Demand Level 
Online Generation 
Capacity 
Figure 17: Tree-Structure HMM for Electricity Markets 
The Switching HMM (SHMM) allows multiple dependencies to be dynamically 
chosen by a switch variable. The SHMM as shown in Figure 18 incorporates the impact of 
transmission networks. The congestion of transmission networks has significant impacts on 
how the electricity prices will be determined by the supply and demand forces. 
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Figure 18: Switching HMM for Electricity Markets LMP Decomposition 
Other extensions of HMM are also possible and see potential applications in 
modeling electricity markets. In addition, electric markets can be modeled with multiple 
HMMs. Each HMM approximates a time-segment of the electricity market such as base-
load, intermediate-load and peak-load markets. Multiple HMMs are linked together by the 
system states. The ending states of the last HMM are the initial states of the next HMM in 
the chain. 
HMM combines electricity market structure, architecture, and competition strategies 
of market players into one integrated mathematical framework. The electricity market 
structure and architecture determine the structure of an HMM such as how many market 
states exist and the definitions of a market state. The economic position of a market player 
determines its competition strategies, which in turn jointly determines how an electricity 
market evolves from one state to another, namely the transition matrix. The randomness 
caused by unintended forecast errors is defined with the distribution of prices for each 
specific market state. The following example estimates an HMM with historical data from 
NYISO. 
This example models an hourly electric energy market with the simplest HMM, 
regime switching, having three market states where each has a discrete distribution for 
observable prices. The markets states are defined based on the relationship between supply 
and demand for electricity. For a given level of demand on electricity, there are three 
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possible levels of online generation capacity and thus different market states defined in 
Equation 8. 
If the second most expensive generator is operating at its partial capacity, the market 
is assumed to be in "Punch-In" state, which means that generators are trying to be get 
dispatched and might be suffering loss. The incentive for a GENCO to operate at such a 
level is that a GENCO is expecting higher margins in the coming market hours. The reason 
forces a GENCO to operate at such a level is that there are time-constraints on a generators' 
operating. In order to be able to operate at its full capacity at higher prices of peaking hours, 
a generator must get dispatched and ramp up its capacity according to its time constraints. 
Other possibility is that a GENCO is shutting down after peak hours, but could not reduce its 
generating level fast enough. "Punch-In" market states often occur during the hours 
immediately before peaking hours, for example, 8AM - 10AM or hours immediately after 
peaking hours, for example, 8PM-10PM. If the second most expensive generator is operating 
at its full capacity, the market is assumed to be in "Harvesting" state, which means that all 
generators except the marginal generator are already at their fully capacity at a price level 
above their production cost. However, the market is in equilibrium for the marginal 
generator is operating at its production cost and there is no incentives for other offline 
generator to punch-in the markets. "Harvesting" market states often occur during non-peak 
hours with relative slow and expected demand changes, for example, 10PM-8AM. If the 
marginal generator is operating at its fully capacity, the market is assumed to be in "Ripping-
Off" state, which means all generators are operating at premiums. "Ripping-Off" market 
states often occur when the transmission network is congested or outages of generation. 
"Ripping-Off' market states are often observed with price spikes in pairs, for outages and 
congestions are often mitigated by the ISOs/RTOs. 
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MarketState = 
Harvesting if Cap(n)>= Demand > = Cap(n-1) 
Punch - In if Demand < = Cap( n-1) 
Ripping - Off if Demand > = Cap(n) 
-Cap(n) = Capacity of all n online units 
-Cap( n-l)= Capacity of (n-1) online units 
except the most expensive unit (Marginal Unit) 
Equation 8: Three-States Regime Switching 
The distributions of observable prices given a specific market state are assumed to be 
discrete and have a daily price pattern as defined in Table 3. The true and estimated 
parameters for the market are also shown in Table 3, and simulated prices paths are shown in 
Figure 19. The Baum-Welch algorithm is employed to estimate the model, which converged 
in two iterations. 
The market states transition matrix defines the probability for the market to transit 
from a given state to another. For example, the number "0.58" observed at the left-up corner 
defines the probability for the market to transit from state-1 (Punch-In) at time T to state-1 
(Punch-In) at time T+l. The price distribution given market states matrix defines the 
probability of price to come from three levels (Low, Mid and High) given a market state at 
time T. For example, the number "0.18" observed at the left-up corner defines the 
probability for a "Low" price to be observed if a market is in state-1 (Punch-In). This 
example uses true parameters to simulate prices. The simulated prices are then used to 
estimate the true parameters assuming a guess defined as initial parameters. 
Table 3: Three States Regime Switching Example 
Market States 
Definition 
State-1(S-l) State-2(S-2) State-3(S-3) 
Punch-In Harvesting Ripping-Off 
Market States Transition Matrix 
State-1 State-2 State-3 
S-l True Parameters 0.58 0.32 0.1 
Initial Parameters 0.2 0.8 0.0 
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Estimated Values 0.5624 0.3254 0.1122 
S-2 
True Parameters 0.275 0.45 0.275 
Initial Parameters 0.05 0.9 0.05 
Estimated Values 0.2999 0.4228 0.2773 
S-3 
True Parameters 0.1 0.32 0.58 
Initial Parameters 0.0 0.8 0.2 
Estimated Values 0.1143 0.3071 0.5786 
Price Distributions Given Market State 
Lower 
Price 
Normal 
Price 
S-l 
True Parameters 0.18 0.64 
Initial Parameters 0.7 0.2 
Estimated Values 0.1767 0.6386 
True Parameters 0.18 0.64 
S-2 Initial Parameters 0.1 0.8 
Estimated Values 0.1866 0.6323 
True Parameters 0.18 0.64 
S-3 Initial Parameters 0.1 0.2 
Estimated Values 0.1587 0.6484 
Daily Price Pattern 
Time (Hour) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Price ($/MWh) 15 15 15 15 17 19 21 23 
Time (Hour) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Price ($/MWh) 25 27 30 34 40 50 40 34 
Time (Hour) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Price ($/MWh) 30 27 25 23 21 19 17 15 
100 
°0 20 40 60 80 100 120 
Hours 
Figure 19: Simulated Price Paths from FHMM 
48 
The following example assumes and estimates a FHMM for the Day-Ahead houyly 
market in west control area of NYISO from April 7th to July 27th 2003 [52]. Day-Ahead 
market trades the bulk of electricity, therefore most reflective of the whole electricity 
markets. The FHMM includes prices on electric energy and ancillary services (30-minutes 
spinning reserve). The model estimation employs the Baum-Welch algorithm [44], and the 
estimated parameters are shown in Table 4. 
Similar to the state transition probability shown in Table-3, Table-4 defines the 
probability of the electricity market transit from one state to another. The difference lies in 
that FHMM shown in Table-4 are driven by two factors: demand and supply. The up-left 
corner of "Demand on Electric Energy States Transition Matrix", "0.9229", defines the 
probability of a demand of level "Low" at time T to transit to level "Low" at time T+l. The 
supply transition probability is conditional on not only the previous supply state but also the 
demand level. The up-left corner of "Online Generation Capacity States Transition Matrix", 
"0.9585", defines the probability of supply of level "Low" to transit to level "Low" when the 
current demand is at "Low" level. The prices for any given market states are approximated 
by a normal distribution. The mean and variances of the normal distributions are shown in 
Table-4. 
Only online generation capacity is considered as effective supply for physical 
operating constraints limit prohibit offline generation capacity to produce on short notice less 
than one hour. On current electricity markets, demand shows no self-price elasticity while 
the generators have control over its productions. The market observed clearing quantity is in 
fact the demand, but not the supply. The supply includes all the generation capacity "bid" 
into electricity markets, which are only partially observable. For the Day-Ahead markets, the 
physically online generation capacity at a specific hour does not necessarily equals to the 
capacity bid into markets, thereby hidden to a GENCO. 
Table 4: FHMM Example 
Demand on Electric Energy States Transition Matrix 
Low Normal High 
Demand at T = Low 0.9229 0.0771 0 
Demand at T = Normal 0.0199 0.9634 0.0168 
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Demand at T = High 0 0.1085 0.8915 
Online Generation Capacity States Transition Matrix 
If Online Generation Capacity at Time T-l = Low 
Demand at T = Low 0.9585 0.0315 0.0100 
Demand at T = Normal 0.9434 0.0466 0.0100 
Demand at T = High 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
If Online Generation Capacity at Time T-l = Normal 
Demand at T = Low 0.2097 0.7803 0.0100 
Demand at T = Normal 0.1531 0.8369 0.0100 
Demand at T = High 0.5898 0.4002 0.0100 
If Online Generation Capacity at Time T-l = High 
Demand at T = Low 0.0000 0.9900 0.0100 
Demand at T = Normal 0.0000 0.9900 0.0100 
Demand at T = High 0.0000 0.9900 0.0100 
Interdependency of Demand on Ancillary Service on Demand of 
Electric Energy 
Demand at T = Low 0.8801 0.1199 0.0000 
Demand at T = Normal 0.3309 0.6469 0.0222 
Demand at T = High 0.0000 0.1116 0.8884 
Price on Electric Energy (Normal Distributions, Mean, Normalized) 
Supply = Low Normal High 
Demand at T = Low 0.8794 1. 0344 1.3702 
Demand at T = Normal 1.0027 0.9054 0.9188 
Demand atT = High 1.1951 1.2513 1.3896 
Price on Electric Energy (Variance, Normalized) 
Supply = Low Normal High 
Demand at T = Low 0.0341 0.0616 0.0100 
Demand atT = Normal 0.0342 0.0815 0.0100 
Demand atT = High 0.0680 0.0863 0.0275 
The FHMM provides more insight into electricity markets such as the interaction of 
demand on electric energy and ancillary services, the interdependency between demand on 
electricity and supplied online generation capacity. Although the FHMM is much richer than 
regime switching example, it is still a very simplified model. More complicated HMM could 
provide the foundation to launch the Monte Carlo simulation, which could be enhanced to 
incorporate more structures. The FHMM estimated assumes no transmission congestion, 
which is justified the strong transmission network at "West" control area of NYISO. 
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More work on modeling such as incorporating the impacts of transmission networks 
in details requires more information about the specified market than is readily available, and 
will be discussed in section 3.4. 
3.4 Location Marginal Price- Zonal/Nodal Pricing Framework 
The HMM discussed in section 3.3 implicitly assumes an integrated electricity market 
supported by a perfect transmission network. However, the current electric power 
transmission network was not designed to support commerce. Congestions of electric power 
transmission network segment into electricity markets into zones and buses. Location 
Marginal Price- Zonal/Nodal Pricing Framework trades electric energy and other services 
according to their time-varying and location dependent values [51]. Location Marginal Price 
(LMP) has seen more and more implementations for its recognition of the time varying and 
location dependent value of electricity. 
The LMP for a specific electric power system bus at time T is defined as the marginal 
cost of serving electric energy if a small incremental of load is to be served. The LMP for 
any electric power system bus/node is jointly determined by the offers provided by 
Generation Companies (GENCO), bids provided by Electric Service Companies (ESCO) or 
Load Serving Entities (LSEs), and the status of transmission network. Figure 20 shows the 
LMP framework implemented in PJM [21]. 
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Figure 20: LMP Framework Implemented in PJM 
The pricing algorithm shown in Figure 20 captures both the locational nature and the 
marginal nature of LMP. The locational nature of LMP is determined by the topology of the 
electric power transmission system. A contribution vector is defined to represent the electric 
power transmission system physical driver in Equation 9. The marginal nature of LMP is 
captured by the incremental cost of supplying one more unit of electric energy. An offering 
price vector is defined to describe the economic drivers, namely the offers provided by 
Generation Companies (GENCO), in Equation 9. The physical and economic drivers jointly 
determine LMP, which is the product of the contribution vector and the offering price vector 
shown in Equation 9. 
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ContributionFactorx 
LMP _Busl = : 
ContributionFactorn 
* [GENCO _ Offert ... GENCO _Offern] 
subject to : ^  ContributinFactor = 1 
1=1 
n : Numbers of Buses connected with Busi 
Equation 9: LMP Decomposition as Physical and Economic Drivers 
An example clarifies the concept and algorithm of LMP. Figure 21 illustrates a 
simplified fully connected three-nodes transmission network. All three transmission lines are 
assumed to have equal reactance, which means that the electric distances between three buses 
are the same. The topology and electric distances between buses jointly determine how 
electric energy flows through the transmission network, namely the feasible set of 
contribution factors. Each transmission line is assumed to be capable of transferring 100MW 
of electric energy. 
BUS_2 
GEN=200MW 
TranLimit 
lOOMVA BUS_1 
GEN=200MW 
TranLimit 
lOOMVA 
TranLimit 
lOOMVA 
BUS_3 
GEN=50MW LOAD=l 80MW 
Figure 21: Illustration of LMP 
The load is assumed to have no self-price elasticity, which holds true in current 
electricity markets. Generation resources are assumed to have different but constant 
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production costs to simplify this example. Table 5 illustrates the generators' offers, 
generation outputs, and the final LMP at all three buses. 
Table 5: LMP Example Calculation 
Bus_l BUS_2 Bus_3 
Generation 
Offers 
$10/MWh $12/MWh $20/MWh 
Generation 
Output 
12 OMW 6 OMW OMW 
Load OMW OMW 180MW 
LMP $10/MWh $12/MWh $14/MWh 
It is assumed that the load at BUS_3 is to increase by 1MW, and then the generation 
output from BUS_1 needs to decrease by 1MW while the generation output from BUS_2 
needs to increase by 2MW. The exact numbers are determined by the physical parameters of 
electric power transmission system and physical laws. In this example, it is the topology of 
the three buses transmission system and equivalence of transmission line reactance. The total 
increase cost of serving the load of one more MW at BUS_3, the LMP at BUS_3, is 
calculated as in Equation 10. 
LMP _BUS3 =[$10/MWh,$12/MWh] 
= $14/MWh 
Equation 10: LMP Example Calculation 
As shown in this example, the contribution factors of transmission system are defined 
by the topology of transmission system, demand to be served, and Available Transmission 
Capability (ATC). The offers entering LMP calculation are defined by merchant generators' 
offers. 
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3.5 Modeling LMP with HMM 
LMP captures not only the demand and supply forces of electricity but also the 
operational impacts of the electric power systems. The modeling of LMP requires modeling 
of both the underlying physical electric power system and modeling of the economic supply 
and demand forces. This section proposes to model the movement of LMP with HMM. The 
movement of LMP is decomposed into physical and economic drivers as in HMM. 
The physical drivers include transmission network topology and generation 
technology. The physical electric power system defines the technologies of the electricity 
markets. The technologies of electricity markets define the cost structures of electricity 
markets, including both the costs of electricity generation and transmission. The electricity 
cost structure of electricity provides a foundation for modeling the market prices of 
electricity for an efficient electricity market sets the market prices of electricity to the 
marginal costs of supplying electricity. The marginal cost of supplying electricity includes 
generation cost, transmission cost and losses. 
The marginal costs of generating electricity are determined by the incremental cost of 
the marginal generator, which is in turn jointly determined by demand level, cost of fuel, 
generation composition and environmental cost. The generation compositions of electricity 
markets, also referred to as generation stack, differ based on the availabilities of raw energy 
resources, environmental regulations, and transportation supports. Figure 22 categorizes the 
sources of raw energy sources into two groups: Fuel traded on Markets and Renewable 
energy not tradable. 
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Figure 22: Energy Sources 
Table 6 illustrates the electricity generation composition of several regional electricity 
markets in North America. It is shown that the generation composition could be significantly 
different between electricity markets. 
Table 6: Generation Technology Composition in U.S. Electricity Markets 
PJM NERTO NYISO ERCOT CA 
Gas 31% 32% 90% 75% 46% 
Oil 21% 28% 74% 38% 1% 
Coal 37% 9% 0% 21% 0% 
Nuclear 21% 16% 0% 7% 9% 
Hydro 5% 12% 1% 1% 23% 
Others 1% 2% 0% 0% 21% 
Some generator could switch fuels, thus the sums of percentages do not necessarily equal to 100%. 
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The marginal cost and market values of transmission service diverge on electricity 
markets. The marginal cost of transmitting electricity is either zero or infinity depending on 
the status of a specific transmission system. When extra transmission capacity is available, 
the marginal cost of transmitting electricity is zero. The marginal cost of transmitting 
electricity is infinity when transmission congestions occur. Dispatching more expansive 
generation sources or withholding demand on electricity could mitigate the lack of 
transmission capability. This provides synthetic transmission capability, and leads to market 
values of transmission capability. The market values of transmission services are captured 
by the differences of LMPs at different locations on transmission systems. 
The physical nature of electric power system determines not only the cost structure of 
supplying electricity; it also has significant impacts on the movement of LMP. The non-
storable nature of electricity contributes to the significant volatilities and spikes of LMP. 
Another important driving force of the electricity market comes from economic drivers. 
The economics drivers determine the structure and architecture of electricity markets. 
The structure and architecture of electricity markets define how electricity market fluctuates 
around its equilibriums and how LMP differs from marginal costs of supplying electricity. 
The notion of market structure, developed as part of the "structure-conduct-
performance" paradigm of industrial organization, measures the concentration for the 
ownership of production capacity with indexes such as Hirschmann Herfindahl Index (HHI). 
Although the electric power industry restruction breaks the vertically integrated electric 
utility structure into horizontally independent entities market structure, electricity markets are 
not perfectly competitive. Imperfect electricity markets observe the divergence of market 
prices and marginal cost of supplying electricity. 
Market architecture defines how market players interact with each other and how 
electricity and information are exchanged and shared on electricity markets. Market 
architectures are implemented as a set of sub-markets and the linkages between them. The 
sub-markets could be categorized by many criteria such as commodity traded, contracts 
traded, the trading mechanism and authority of ISO/RTO. The linkages between sub-markets 
may be implicit price bindings enforced by arbitrage or explicit rules linking rights purchased 
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in one market to activity in another. The market architecture provides incomplete market 
information to market participants, whose profit-maximization behaviors jointly determine 
the movement of electricity markets. 
The economic drivers also include fuel prices, demand uncertainties, and profit 
maximization of market participants with incomplete information. The economic drivers 
define how LMP differs from cost while the physical drivers of electricity markets defines 
the cost structure of electricity market. System-states-depending random processes are 
utilized to capture the impacts of economics drivers. 
An example illustrates to decompose LMP movements into physical and economic 
drivers as a FHMM. LMPs are modeled to be weighted sums of samples from the GENCOS' 
offer distributions. The GENCOS' offers are modeled with probabilistic distributions. The 
contribution factor determines the weights assigned to GENCOS' offers. The dynamics of 
contribution factors are defined with partially observable Markov processes as shown in 
Figure 23. 
LMP _ Busj = Contribution _ Vector * GENCO _ Offer _ Vector 
Contribution Vector Space, 
Estimated with Engineering Data Economic Drivers 
Estimated with 
Historical Data 
ollow a Markov Process 
Figure 23: Modeling LMP with FHMM 
The contribution factors capture the impact of transmission system and could be 
estimated using engineering data on electric power systems. Multiple contribution factors 
compose a closed system state space. Markov processes are employed to capture the 
transition of contribution factors within the system state space. A state transition probability 
matrix describes the probability of contribution factor change from one state to another, 
conditional on the demand level of electric power and other factors. 
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System-dependent GENCOs offers' distributions capture the generation composition, 
fuel cost, demand, and most importantly market dynamics. The distributions could be 
calibrated using historical market data. The marginal GENCOs offers could be further 
decomposed into Selection Factor, "financially synthetic electricity cost", and the cost-offer 
spread. The selection factor identifies marginal generators from the generation stack. The 
financially synthetic electricity cost captures the heat rate and fuel cost. The cost-offer 
spread captures the profit-maximization behaviors of GENCOS. Equation 11 illustrates the 
further decomposition of GENCOs' offers. 
SelectionFactorx 
GENCO _Offer = \ 
SelectionFactorm 
*[HeatRate1 *Fuelx ... HeatRatem * Fuelm ] 
+ Cost _Offer _ Spread 
subject to : SelectionF actor E {0,1} 
m : Numbers of Generation Units at Busj 
Equation 11: Further Decomposition of GENCOs' Offers 
Combined together, this approach models LMP to be generated from multiple random 
processes. The proposed hybrid model is mathematically equivalent with structured 
regression models. The dependent variable LMP is modeled to be dependent on a set of 
independent variables such as fuel prices, load levels and others. The FHMM distinguishes 
itself with simple regression models by assuming structured multiple regression equations. 
This is similar with the regime-switching model, which assumes that electricity markets to 
transition between multiple regimes. However, the regime-switching model relies only on 
historical market data, therefore does not incorporate physical drivers of electricity markets. 
FHMM combines the strengths of both fundamental economic modeling and mark-to-market 
stochastic modeling. The physical driver captures the strengths of engineering-based 
production cost modeling approach while the economic drivers captures the strength of mark-
to-market approach. The decomposition provides a modeler the capability and tools for 
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structural modeling of LMP. The key market drivers could be identified and be appropriately 
modeled to capture the heterogeneous nature of electricity. 
An example is given to illustrate the decomposition of LMP with FHMM. The 
following example models the LMP at a 500KV bus in PJM with the proposed FHMM. A 
portion of the 500KV transmission network in PJM is simplified to a fully connected three-
buses transmission network and shown in Figure 24. 
Salem 
Power Source 
Branchburg 
Power Source 
500KV Transformers 
Congested 
Deans, Ewindsor, Smithburg 
Load Pocket 
Figure 24: Simplified PJM 500KV Transmission Network 
This example focuses on LMP at a 500KV bus, DEANS. Four other 500KV buses, 
BRANCHBURG, EWINDSOR, SALEM, and SMITHBURG, connect to DEANS. The 
correlations between hourly LMPs at DEAN, EWINDSOR and SMITHBURG are very high, 
thus modeled as one single bus as load pocket. Both of SALEM and BRANCHBURG are 
modeled as generation sources. SALEM is connected to a nuclear power plant while 
BRANCHBURG is connected to a few power plants. Bus SALEM and BRANCHBURG are 
modeled to be connected in order to capture the impact of remaining 500KV transmission 
network. The historical price data used are from the Real Time market of PJM from June to 
Aug 2004. Weekends and holidays are removed, which leads to 65 working days with 1560 
samples. This example focuses on decomposing physical drivers and economic drivers of 
LMP by adopting simplified models for both transmission network and economic drivers. 
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The modeled congested transmission route is the 500KV transmission line from 
BRANCHBURG to DEANS. The contribution factors are estimated using historical data. A 
linear regression on the LMPs for congested hours shows that: 
LMP_ Deans = [LMP__Branchburg,LMP_Salem]*[/?,,/?2] 
[44] = [-0-4289,1.3247] 
r z i  f - 0 . 5 0 3 7  1.2890 95% Confidence Interval for [#,# J = 
-0.3541 1.3603 
Equation 12: LMP Contribution Factors 
Although the ^ContributinFacto^ = 1 constraint is not strictly enforced, solving a 
i=i 
constrained regression could easily satisfy it. The residual plot illustrated in Figure 25 
demonstrates a satisfactory fit except less than 10 outfitters. A stress-testing model should 
capture such extreme events. 
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Figure 25: Contribution Factor Estimation Residual Plot 
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The transmission system transition probability matrix is estimated using historical PJM 
transmission network operating data 
Transition_Matrix No-Congestion Congestion 
No-Congestion 0.943478 0.056522 
Congestion 0.158537 0.841463 
Equation 13: Markov Transition Probability Matrix 
The hypotheses that LMPs at BRANCHBURG and SALEM during congestion follow 
normal/lognormal distributions are significantly rejected. This work models normalized 
LMPs during congestion to follow beta distributions. 
95% Confidence Level 
95% Confidence Level = 
Branchberg& Beta(2.7551,2.7079) 
"2.5921 2.5247 
2.9182 2.8911 
Salem e Beta(6.6749,3-1181) 
"6.4713 2.9488" 
6.8785 3.2875 
Deans & Beta(2.0597,3.3121) 
"1.9126 3.1425" 
95% Confidence Level = 
2.2027 3.4888 
Equation 14: GENCOs' Offer Distribution 
As shown in this example, this hybrid model provides valuable insight and flexibility 
into factorizing the uncertainties observed in LMP movements. Such capabilities are of 
importance since significant risks and opportunities confront GENCOs often during 
congested peaking time intervals. 
The advantages of FHMM over the time series approach lie mainly with the 
interpretation of volatilities and correlations. The significant volatilities and unique volatility 
patterns are interpreted by realizing that all the observed samples are drawn from multiple 
distributions. This feature also helps to interpret the correlation between LMP and fuel 
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prices. The prices spikes observed are explained as the outputs of low-probability states. 
The clusters of prices spikes are interpreted by the instabilities of low-probability states. 
The advantages of HMM over the production cost modeling approach lies mainly 
with the utilization of history market data and capturing of economic drivers. The 
assumptions that GENCOs bid at their marginal cost are removed by incorporating historical 
market data. The replacing of detailed modeling of electric power transmission system with 
a Hidden Markov processed for contribution factors significantly improves the computational 
efficiency, reduces the modeling efforts, and most importantly changes the deterministic 
results into stochastic results. 
3.6 Extended HMM into Mid/Long-Term Electricity Markets 
Modeling 
HMM can also be used to model electricity markets in mid-term and long-term. Mid­
term market movements are assumed to be limited to changes caused by the different 
competition strategies employed by market participants within the same market structure. 
The same HMM with different sets of parameters is used to model the mid-term market 
movement as shown in Figure 26. An electricity market is assumed to settle with different 
equilibrium within the same market structure until a threshold is reached, which in turn leads 
to changes of market structure in the long term. 
Long-term market movements are assumed to be market structure changes such as 
generation units' entries and retirements, long-term demand trends, fuel costs, transmission 
networks, and technology advancements. HMMs with different structures are employed to 
model the long-term market movements as shown in Figure 26 
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Mid-Term 1 Mid-Term 1' 
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Mid-Term_2'' 
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i Mid-Term 2' 
HMM 2' J 
Mid-Term_2 
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:> Market Movement lead to changes in parameters of HMM 
Market Movement lead to different HMM 
Figure 26: Mid/Long-Term Electricity Market Modeling with HMM 
High-quality forecasts for Mid-/Long-Term electricity markets are prohibitive 
expensive if all possible. This work proposes to capture the extreme uncertainties and 
fuzziness with fuzzy sets and numbers. The fuzzy approach allows a modeler to incorporate 
subjective judgments from experts. Most often, such estimation is of fuzzy nature and could 
not be fitted into a probabilistic way without sacrificing it values. 
Fuzzy numbers could enter HMM by many ways. This work proposes construing a 
fuzzy states transition matrix to capture the fuzziness of electricity market movements. 
Fuzzy numbers are employed to define the possibilities of electricity market transition. 
Fuzzy numbers are special cases of fuzzy sets and this work applies triangle fuzzy numbers 
as shown in Figure 27. A symmetric triangle fuzzy numbers is defined by its center a and 
half-width c. 
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o 
a a+ c 
Figure 27: Symmetric Triangle Fuzzy Number 
A fuzzy function is a generalization of a classical crisp function and it can be defined 
in many ways. This work adopts a classical definition for fuzzy function of fuzzy numbers 
as illustrated below. 
Assume a function Y  =  f ( X , A )  with its inputs, outputs and parameters x , Y ,and A all 
defined as crisp numbers. Given a parameter set A , this function maps X to Y. Given a 
fuzzy number Â , a fuzzy function / : X <p(Y) mapping X to <p(Y) : set of all fuzzy subsets on Y is 
defined by a membership function on Y. 
This chapter models electricity markets with Hidden Markov Model. This modeling 
approach is the foundation of an integrated generation assets valuation solution. 
y = /(%,A), 
Membership function for Y 
max [//A(«)], { a \ y  =  f ( x , a ) } * 0  {a\y=f(x ,a)}  
0, otherwise 
Equation 15: Definition of Fuzzy Function 
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Chapter 4'.Valuation of Generation Assets 
This chapter focuses on the valuation of generation assets. Generation assets are 
modeled as real options to capture the operating flexibility embedded into generation assets. 
Section 4.1 introduces the approach of real option and focuses on the formulation and 
solution of real option problems. Section 4.2 valuates generation assets as real options. The 
valuation problem is formulated as Partially Observable Market Decision Problem (POMDP) 
and solved with Markov Lattices. Section 4.2 also estimates values of information by 
comparing the difference between POMDP and MDP. Section 4.3 focuses on investment 
opportunities in generation assets and incorporates fuzzy information. 
4.1 Real Option as a Valuation Approach 
Real option theory extends financial option theory to real assets, and incorporates a 
few features associated only with real assets. The formulation and solution of real option 
problem should be capable to incorporate the features of real option. 
The first feature is market movements. The underlying assets of real options are 
often consumable commodities, which not only have investment values but also satisfy 
consumption needs. The prices of commodities behave differently with financial assets. 
Commodities prices often demonstrate seasonality, mean-reversion and other features. This 
feature needs to be addressed during the modeling process of the underlying markets. 
Chapter three proposes to capture this feature using HMM. 
Secondly, the alternatives for exercising/operating real options are different. There 
are physical constraints on the exercises of real options. While most financial options can be 
traded/exercised freely as long as markets are open, the exercise of real option is subject to 
operating constraints. The timing constraints of generation assets significantly reduce the 
available alternatives to GENCOs. The set of alternatives for operating real assets are more 
limited. There are often non-trial costs associated with exercising real option, which further 
reduces the economic feasibility of alternatives. The startup and shutdown of generation 
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assets could be expensive under some situations that GENCOs might be better off if running 
at loss. Also, an owner of real options can change the value of its real assets by actively 
managing its real assets. The owners of financial options only have the choice to trade, hold 
or exercise the options while the owners of real assets could choose between upgrading, 
mothballing among other choices. In fact, more active management can be done on real 
options, compared to passively trading/exercising on financial options. This feature needs to 
be addressed from the perspective of solving a real option problem. This chapter begins with 
a review of the past research on formulating and solving generation assets real options. 
Methods to valuate real options are based on methods to valuate financial options, 
and modified to incorporate features of real assets. The following section categorizes 
approaches by their information requirement and techniques to analyze information. 
The prices movements of electricity could be defined by partial differential equations 
and solved with close-formed formulas. Partial differential equations need the least 
information during the modeling stage, and provide solutions similar to Black-Scholes' 
formula for financial options. The tradeoffs are strong assumptions on markets, price 
movements and loss of flexibility. Often, this approach assumes that: 
• Forward markets for both of electricity and fuel are complete and efficient in the 
sense of arbitrage free 
• Ramp ups and ramp downs of the plant can be done immediately, thus no physical 
constraints 
• Prices of electricity follow a special stochastic process and distributions such as GBM 
and Log-normal distributions 
Fleten et al. [53] investigate optimal entry and exit threshold values of spark spread 
for gas fired power plant using close-form approach. The solution provides more insights 
than traditional discounted cash flow approaches. Uncertainty increases the threshold to 
build a new power plant while decreases the threshold to abandon an exiting power plant. 
Differential equations provide a rough estimate of values of generation assets at a 
very low cost of information. However, a lot of features are lost and its application is very 
limited. Close-form approaches have difficulties on valuating American, Asian and exotic 
options. 
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Improvements and refinements on this approach have been under intensive research. 
Features such as price spikes, mean-reversion, and others are added into models for 
electricity markets movements 
Multinomial tree is a more flexible technique to valuate real options, for it is easy to 
implement and understand. One advantage of multinomial tree is its capability to valuate 
American option, which can be exercised earlier before its maturity. Another advantage is 
the capability to incorporate carrying cost, which could be maintenance cost for idling a 
power plant. 
Multinomial tree approximates the operation of generation assets by discrete 
production levels, and is very similar with stochastic dynamic programming. Both of them 
utilize backward induction, and optimize the operation of generation assets. Gardner et al 
[16] applied stochastic dynamic programming to valuate generation assets, and mean-
reversion GBM for price movement is assumed. Their research focused on searching of 
optimal operating policy boundaries, which are defined as expected spark spread at a future 
time accounting for time constraints for a generator to reach that optimal state. Deng et al 
[14] used quadrinomial tree to implement the spark option assuming that the prices of fuel 
and electricity are correlated. They also investigated the impact of physical constraints under 
different price movements, and concluded that the mean-reversion price movement enhances 
the impacts of physical constraints. Also, they pointed out that GBM does not present 
electric power prices well. 
Multinomial tree or stochastic dynamic programming makes compromise between 
accuracy of modeling and computing requirement. Further refinement of the modeling of 
price movement would increase the accuracy of valuation and also makes the model more 
complex, for example seasonality of prices on electricity addressing peak and off-peak price 
movements. However, stochastic dynamic programming is not an open framework for it is 
hard to add more than one commodity and other operation objectives because it suffers the 
dimensional curse. Most of the researches deploying multinomial tree or stochastic dynamic 
programming assumed only electric energy, and ignored ancillary services. In fact, the 
values of generation assets depend closely on prices of both electricity and fuels. 
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Another approach for solving real option is simulation. Tseng et al [17] integrated 
forward-moving Monte Carlo simulation with backward-moving dynamic programming to 
investigate the impact of physical constraints on valuation of generation assets. The research 
focused on searching for indifference locus on which the unit commitment decisions "on" 
and "off' are equivalent in terms of expected profit. The authors pointed out, the iterative 
forward simulation and backward induction requires massive computations. They also 
concluded that simulation provides extra flexibilities, such as irregular price processes or 
other commodities like spinning reserves. 
Simulation utilizes brute-force to valuate generation assets, while it still needs to 
assume distributions and price movement. Massive computation limits the application of 
simulation to mid-term and long-term valuation. Computation burden also limits the 
sensitivity analysis, which could be easily provided by close-formed approaches. Sensitivity 
analysis is of important in the operation of GENCOs, providing guideline for hedging and 
risk management. 
Past researches assumed static markets with static market structure and architectures. 
Mid-term and long-term valuations are achieved by multiplying short-term results. 
Table 7 summarizes the three approaches to apply real option analysis to valuation of 
generation assets. More discussion on real option analysis and its application can be found in 
references [54]. 
Table 7: Comparison of Real Option Solution 
Differential Equations Multinomial Tree Simulation 
European/American Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
Flexibility No Medium Max 
Computation Power Least Medium Max 
Price Movement GBM/Spikes GBM GBM/Other 
Physical Constraints No Yes Yes 
Market Structure Liquid Liquid N/A 
Commodities Single Single Multiple 
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4.2 Formulation of Generation Assets with MDP and POMDP 
This section identifies Markov Decision Problem (MDP) and Partially Observable 
Markov Decision Problem (POMDP) as real option analysis approaches. The operation of 
generation assets is first formulated as an MDP with full observability, and then extends to 
POMDP with partial observability. 
4.2.1 Formulation of Generation Assets Valuation as MDP 
MDP has seen successful application with sequential decision-making because it 
optimizes between the immediate rewards and the future gains to yield the optimal solution. 
When the electricity markets are modeled with Markov Processes, it is shown that the 
operation of generation assets can be modeled and solved with MDP. Figure 28 
demonstrates the application of MDP to the valuation and operation of generation assets. 
Linear programming, dynamic programming, and other algorithms can be used to solve an 
MDP [37]. MDP not only provides the value of generation assets, but also the optimal 
operating policy. 
Immediate Cost/Value 
StartUp/ShutDown 
j Immediate Revenue 
Future 
Cost/Value 
Objective 
Alternatives 
Physical Constraints 
Generator 
Constraints 
Electricity 
Markets 
Markov Processes 
Unit Commitment 
Economic Dispatch 
Figure 28: MDP for Generation Assets Valuation 
A decision maker using MDP is in fact following a real option analysis approach in 
the following way. First, MDP recognizes and incorporates the operation flexibilities by 
allowing decision makers to respond differently based on the latest observations. Second, 
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MDP measures the option value using expected future gains. MDP often finds optimal 
strategies, where foregoing immediate rewards captures the future option values. The 
relationship between immediate rewards and expected future gains is similar to the 
relationship between option intrinsic value and option time value. 
The sequential decision problem solved by MDP is identical to a real option problem 
where uncertainties are structured to evolve as Markov processes. Figure 29 defines a 
Markov lattice to model the evolvement of electricity markets states, where electricity price 
movement at each state is approximated with a multinomial tree. Markov lattices have been 
shown to be easier to construct and converge faster than multiple-period multinomial trees 
when applied to option pricing [38]. The probability embedded in the Markov processes 
should be replaced with risk-neutral probabilities if a single risk-neutral discount rate is to be 
used. The risk-neutral probabilities do not equal the true physical probabilities but are 
modified to construct a risk-neutral world, where a single risk-free discount rate is used 
throughout the decision process. Hull states that it could be assumed that electricity price 
behaves in the same way in risk-neutral and real world. The reason is that the percentage 
change in electricity price has negligible correlation with market return. Therefore, the risk-
neutral growth rate on electricity could be estimated by real world observation. Modeling 
generation assets as real option on electricity could use the risk-neutral growth rate as the 
growth rate and no adjustment is need [7], 
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Price Price Price Price Price Price 
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Real Option Values 
Market States 
Real Option Values 
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Figure 29: Markov Lattice based on HMM 
The following example illustrates the application of MDP to formulate and solve 
generation assets valuation. Assume an electricity market, which is defined as a FHMM 
shown in Figure 30. The prices on electric energy and ancillary service are determined 
simultaneously by supplied online generation capacities and demand level. Demand on 
electric energy is assumed to evolve autonomously according to a Markov chain. The 
demand on ancillary services is assumed to be dependent on energy demand. The online 
generation capacity is modeled to follow another Markov process, depending on the previous 
supply level and energy demand. 
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Figure 30: Electricity Market Movements 
A thermal generation unit is valued using a Markov chain model in this example. The 
physical constraints for the given generation unit is shown in Table 8. The demand on 
electricity and supplied online generation capacity are modeled to have three states including 
low, intermediate and high. The transition of demand on electricity is modeled to follow a 
Markov chain defined in Table 9. The transition of supplied online generation capacity is 
assumed to be dependent on the previous level of demand and capacity supply. The 
interdependency is modeled to be following a Markov chain defined in Table 10. Only one 
Markov chain is utilized for the whole time span for simplicity. More Markov chains and 
system states could be used to increase the accuracy at cost of computational burden. The 
prices on electric energy and ancillary services are assumed to follow normal distributions 
shown in Table 11 and Table 12. Prices in Table 11 and Table 12 are normalized according 
to the daily price pattern shown in Table 13. Equation 16 provides mathematical definition 
for Table used. All data are generated by market simulations. 
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Table_9 : Probability (Demandt+l = Statej  | Demandt  = Statej) 
Table _10 : Probability (Supply ,+1 = Statet  \ Supply, = f| Demandt  = Statek) 
Table __ 11 : Mean o/ Price af Twie t if Supply, = A Demand, = Statek 
Table _ 12 : Variance of Price at Time t if Supplyt  = Statej f| Demand, = Statek 
Where i,j,ke 1 ,.N,N : Numbers of States 
Equation 16: Definitions for MDP Valuation Tables 
Table 8: Characteristics of Generation Asset 
Generator Physical Characteristics 
Minimum Up Time, Ton 1 Hours 
Minimum Down Time, Toff 1 Hours 
Start-Up Time, Tup 1 Hours 
Shut-Down Time, Tdown 1 Hours 
Ramp Rate, Ramp 100MW/Hour 
Minimum Output Level, Qmin 100MW 
Maximum Output Level, Qmax 400MW 
Heat Rate: H(p), P in MW 
Approximated by Piecewise 
linear functions later 
78+7.97*P+0.00482*PA2 
MMbtu/MWh 
Table 9: Demand Transition Probability Matrix 
Demand Low atT+1 Mid at T+l High at T+l 
Low at T 0.9229 0.0771 0.0000 
Mid atT 0.0199 0.9634 0.0168 
High at T 0.0000 0.1085 0.8915 
Table 10: Supply Transition Probability Matrix 
(Low Supply at T) 
Supply Low 
at T+l 
Supply Mid 
at T+l 
Supply High 
atT+1 
Demand Low at T 0.9585 0.0315 0.0100 
Demand Mid at T 0.9434 0.0466 0.0100 
Demand High at T 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
(Matched Supply at T) 
Supply Low 
atT+1 
Supply Mid 
atT+1 
Supply High 
at T+l 
Demand Low at T 0.2097 0.7803 0.0100 
Demand Mid at T 0.1531 0.8369 0.0100 
Demand High at T 0.5898 0.4002 0.0100 
(Oversupply atT) 
Supply Low 
at T+l 
Supply Mid 
at T+l 
Supply High 
atT+1 
Demand Low at T 0.0000 0.9900 0.0100 
Demand Mid at T 0.0000 0.9900 0.0100 
Demand High at T 0.0000 0.9900 0.0100 
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Table 11: Mean of Prices on Electricity 
Supply Low Supply Mid Supply High 
Demand Low 0.8794 1. 0344 1.3702 
Demand Mid 1.0027 0.9054 0.9188 
Demand High 1.1951 1.2513 1.3896 
Table 12: Variances of Prices on Electricity 
Supply Low Supply Mid Supply High 
Demand Low 0.0341 0.0616 0.0100 
Demand Mid 0.0342 0.0815 0.0100 
Demand High 0.0680 0.0863 0.0275 
Table 13: Daily Pattern of Prices on Electricity 
Daily Price Pattern 
Time (Hour) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Price ($/MWh) 15 15 15 15 17 19 21 23 
Time (Hour) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Price ($/MWh) 25 27 30 34 40 50 40 34 
Time (Hour) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Price ($/MWh) 30 27 25 23 21 19 17 15 
The optimal operating policy of the investigated generation unit defines the optimal 
action for each state. Past researchers searched for a "spark spread" threshold. A generation 
unit is turned on when the expected "spark spread" is greater than the threshold. This 
example shows that the exercises of real option, self unit commitment decision, should not 
only depend on price levels, but more importantly on the current market states of demand and 
supplied online generation capacity. It is shown that a generation unit should not be turned 
on when the demand and supply is in balance even a relative high price is observed. The 
reason is that a relative high price could occur due to randomness in market but not demand 
and supply forces. It is observed that the investigated generation unit should only be turned 
on when demand is high and the market is not in balance. A decision based on both 
underlying economic forces and observed prices provide more value to GENCOs. 
Table 14 defines the optimal generation unit operating policy for the specified 
electricity market. The up-left corner of optimal self unit commitment policy defines a price, 
under which the investigated generation unit should stay off. It is observed that a Generator 
needs lower prices to turn on when the supply is at low. Much higher prices are needed for 
the investigated generator to turn on when the market is already over-supplied. 
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Table 14: Optimal Self Unit Commitment Policy 
Policy 1 (Low Supply) 
Demand Low Demand Mid Demand High 
Price 31.87 36.35 44.81 
Decision Turn On Turn On Turn On 
Price 29.77 33.94 39.11 
Decision Turn Off Turn Off Turn Off 
Policy 2 (Matched Supply) 
Demand Low Demand Mid Demand High 
Price 38.54 34.41 47.78 
Decision Turn On Turn On Stay Off 
Price 34.07 29.23 40.21 
Decision Turn Off Turn Off Turn Off 
Policy 3 (Oversupply) 
Demand Low Demand Mid Demand High 
Price 48.48 32.51 49.94 
Decision Turn On Turn On Turn On 
Price 47.52 31.87 47.27 
Decision Turn Off Turn Off Turn Off 
Table 15: Generation Assets Values v.s. Price Volatilities 
Half Variance Benchmark 
Double 
Variance 
Generation 
Unit Value 
0.9647 1.000 1.1434 
Table 16: Generation Assets Values v.s. Volatilities of Demand and Supply 
More Volatile 
Demand 
Benchmark 
More Volatile 
Supply 
Generation 
Unit Value 
1. 2532 1.000 1.1826 
For a one-week valuation, Table 15 and Table 16 give the normalized value of a 
thermal generation unit with an initial state as off at 1AM under different scenarios. The 
focus is on the comparison of the impacts of changes on demand and supply, and changes on 
the bidding strategies of market players. The changes of demand and supply are based on 
economics forces such as demand composition, fuel prices, and new generation technologies. 
These changes are defined by the demand and supply transition probabilities matrix. Bidding 
strategy changes are defined by the distributions of prices for each market state. Different 
distributions result in different volatilities and payoffs at each market states. All values are 
normalized to facilitate comparison. 
As demonstrated in this example, MDP is identified as a real option approach, which 
enables the dynamic real-time valuation of assets as new information on market state is 
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received. It is also shown that optimal exercise of real option depends on the state of 
electricity markets, but not the observed markets prices. 
4.2.2 Formulation of Generation Assets Valuation as POMDP 
The MDP approach assumes that the electricity markets are fully observable, which is 
not true under most situations, especially within deregulated electricity markets. POMDP is 
a methodology for decision making when the underlying process is modeled with HMM. 
POMDP naturally extends MDP by realizing that market states can only be partially 
observed by market-clearing prices and quantity. The following discusses the difference 
between MDP and POMDP, and the application of POMDP to the valuation and operation of 
generation assets. 
MDP states of the underlying process are completely observable. A policy is a 
mapping from the set of observable states to the set of feasible actions. If both sets are 
assumed to be finite, the number of possible mappings is also finite. An optimal policy can 
be found by conducting a search over this finite set of mappings. 
POMDP states, on the other hand, are only partially observable. Information from 
previous steps needs to be taken into consideration. All such information can be summarized 
by a probability distribution of the current state. In the literature, this probability distribution 
is often referred to as a belief state. The belief space is defined to be the set of all possible 
belief states. In a POMDP, a policy is a mapping from the belief space to the set of actions. 
The final solution of a POMDP is a mapping policy that defines the boundaries in belief state 
space where different decisions should be made. The belief state space is a continuous space, 
although the underlying process has only a finite number of states. This complicates the 
solution of a POMDP. 
Improved computation efficiency could be gained by modifications aimed for specific 
applications, such as valuation of generation assets in electricity markets. Although the 
belief state space is continuous, the periodicity of electricity market mitigates the 
computation burden. If the assumption that an electricity market periodically returns to a 
known state holds, a POMDP could be constructed with known boundary conditions. With a 
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clearly defined boundary and limited time intervals involved, a POMDP can be easily solved. 
One example of those assumptions is that an electricity market returns to a known state with 
matched moderate demand and moderate online generation capacity at a given time interval, 
such as 2 AM. When applied to short-term operation decisions such as unit commitment and 
economic dispatch, physical constraints of generation assets also reduce the feasible actions 
space, thus reduces the computation burden of solving a POMDP. 
The decision-making process shown in Figure 31 illustrates how POMDP is applied 
to valuation of generation assets for this work. POMDP models generation assets as a set of 
European options, which expire along the trading hours of electricity markets. At each time 
interval, the set of European options is valued and optimal decisions on the execution and 
expiration of options are made based on the belief state. 
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Figure 31: POMDP for Generation Assets Valuation 
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When a GENCO observes or receives new information, a new belief state is built 
based on a pre-structured HMM. The first decision is whether to execute call options to 
gather more information at certain costs. Such information helps to refine the belief state and 
facilitate the decision-making process. The following decision is whether to execute options 
to influence the market movement if possible. The last decision is whether to execute 
options to update generation units' operation statuses. Then the market takes over and new 
information is generated and observed. In fact, the call options on information gathering and 
market influencing could be in reverse sequence or parallel exclusive or parallel non­
exclusive. Other options are also possible such as hedging/speculating on 
forward/future/option markets. 
This section illustrates the application of MDP and POMDP with numerical 
examples. Table 17 defines one generator to be investigated. An hourly electric energy 
market is defined with an FHMM with underlying demand on electric power and supplied 
online generation capacity. Both the supply and demand are modeled to have three possible 
states including low, moderate, and high. Table 18 defines the states transition matrixes of 
demand on electricity and supplied online generation capacities. Depending on the states of 
demand and supplied online generation capacity, the prices on electric energy and ancillary 
services are assumed to follow normal distribution, the means, variances and daily pattern are 
also shown in Table 18. The prices of electricity, weather and insurance behave the same in 
the risk-neutral world and real world in such a way that the percentage changes in the 
underlying variable has no correlation with market return. Therefore, the actuarial approach 
for valuation is applicable to valuation of generation assets in that applying historical data to 
get the expected payoff and discount at the risk-free rate [7], Binomial tree is employed to 
approximate the distribution of the price movement given a specific market state. 
Table 17: Physical Characteristics of Generation Unit to be Valuated with POMDP 
Generators Specifications 
Minimum Up Time, Ton (Hours) 1 
Minimum Down Time, Toff (Hours) 1 
Start-Up Time, Tup, (Hours) 1 
Shut-Down Time, Tdown, (Hours) 1 
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Ramp Rate, Ramp, (MW/Hour) 100 
Minimum Output Level, Qmin,(MW) 100 
Maximum Output Level, Qmax,(MW) 200 
Production Cost, $/MWh 32 
Only one Markov chain is utilized for simplicity. More states and HMM chains could 
be used to increase the accuracy at cost of computational efficiency. Ancillary service market 
is also ignored for simplicity. 
Table 18: Hidden Markov Model for Electricity Markets 
Demand on Electric Energy States Transition Matrix 
Low Normal High 
Demand at T = Low 0.9229 0.0771 0 
Demand at T = Normal 0.0199 0.9634 0.0168 
Demand at T = High 0 0.1085 0.8915 
Online Generation Capacity States Transition Matrix 
If Online Generation Capacity atTimeT-1 = Low 
Demand at T = Low 0.9585 0.0315 0.0100 
Demand at T = Normal 0.9434 0.0466 0.0100 
Demand at T = High 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
If Online Generation Capacity at Time T-l = Normal 
Demand at T = Low 0.2097 0.7803 0.0100 
Demand at T = Normal 0.1531 0.8369 0.0100 
Demand at T = High 0.5898 0.4002 0.0100 
If Online Generation Capacity at Time T-l = High 
Demand at T = Low 0.0000 0.9900 0.0100 
Demand at T = Normal 0.0000 0.9900 0.0100 
Demand atT = High 0.0000 0.9900 0.0100 
The states are numbered 1 to 9 and listed in parentheses. 
Price on Electric Energy (Normal Distributions, Mean, Normalized) 
Supply = Low Normal High 
Demand at T = Low 0.8794(1) 1. 0344(2) 1.3702(3) 
Demand at T = Normal 1.0027(4) 0.9054(5) 0.9188(6) 
Demand at T = High 1.1951(7) 1.2513(8) 1.3896(9) 
Price on Electric Energy (Variance, Normalized) 
Supply = Low Normal High 
Demand at T = Low 0.0085(1) 0.0154(2) 0.0025(3) 
Demand at T = Normal 0.0086(4) 0.0204(5) 0.0025(6) 
Demand at T = High 0.0170(7) 0.0216(6) 0.0069(9) 
Daily Price Pattern 
Time (Hour) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Price ($/MWh) 15 15 15 15 17 19 21 23 
Time (Hour) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Price ($/MWh) 25 27 30 34 40 50 40 34 
Time (Hour) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Price ($/MWh) 30 27 25 23 21 19 17 15 
The electricity market states are categorized into four groups as listed in Table 19. 
Each group has a price interval, which is based on the expected price for the states in that 
group. Table 19 also gives the steady-state probability for each state and group using the 
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Chapmen-Kolomogorov Equation. This example is simplified by assuming that a group of 
states, but not the individual state, can be identified from the observed market prices. It is 
also possible to use belief state defined as a distribution about individual states with 
Maximum-Likelihood algorithms. 
Table 19: Categorization of Market States and Corresponding Long Term Probabilities 
P(Group_l) = 0.4166 P(Group_2) = 0.5368 
PCS 1) PCS 5) PCS 6) PCS 2) PCS 4) 
0.1464 0.204 0.0662 0.0355 0.5013 
P(Group 3) = 0.0504 P(Group_4) = 0.0025 
PCS .7) PCS 8) PCS 3) PCS 9) 
0.0443 0.0071 0.0018 0.0007 
This example focuses on the operation of the generation unit. The generation unit is 
assumed to be ON and producing at 300MW/hour at 15PM, and the electricity market state is 
estimated to be group_l. The generation unit needs to be turned down since the highest price 
at 20PM and after is lower than the production cost of the unit. The Markov price lattice is 
shown in Figure 32. 
States Group. 1 : —w States _Group_l r~ « States_Group_l HfcJ States _Group_l —N States_Group_l 
| Statcs_.Group 2 i JjB States Gioup 2 n H States_Group_2 nofl States_Group_2 naS States_Group„2 
Slates Group .4 
15PM 
States_GroupJ 
16PM 
Staies_Grcnip_ 
Statcs_Group_ 
17PM 
Slatcs_Gioup_ 
Status _Gioup 
18PM 
States_Group_3 
Stato>_Group 4a| 
19PM 
Profit if ui pnxiiiclion Loss if in production 
Figure 32: Markov Prices Lattice for POMDP 
Table 20 gives the optimal operation policy solved by POMDP. Table 21 gives the 
optimal operation policy if perfect information is available, which is also the solution to the 
corresponding MDP problem. It is noticed that the optimal operation policy for a state group 
is not always consistent with the optimal operation policies for individual states in such a 
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group. Under such situations, more information about the current market state provides more 
insight on the decisions to be made. 
Table 20: Optimal Operating Policy Based on POMDP 
Time 15PM 16PM 17PM 18PM 19PM 
Group_l On->Off Off Off Off Off 
Group 2 On->On On->Off Off Off Off 
Group_3 On->On On->On On->On On->Off Off 
Group 4 On->On On->On On->Off On->Off On->Off 
State A-> State B: If State A then State B 
Table 21 : Optimal Operation Policy Based on MDP (Perfect Information) 
Time 15PM 16PM 17PM 18PM 19PM 
State 1 0n->0ff Off Off Off Off 
State 5 On->On On->Off Off Off Off 
State 6 On->On On->Off On->Off On->Off On->Off 
State 4 On->Off Off Off Off Off 
State 2 On->On On->Off Off Off Off 
State 7 On->On On->On Off Off Off 
State 8 On->On On->Off Or» Off On->Off Off 
State 3 On->On On->Off On->Off On->Off Off 
State 9 On->On On->On On-> Off On->Off On->Off 
4.2.3 Value of Information 
It is shown that the optimal operation policy under MDP (Perfect Information and 
Observability) is different with the optimal operation policy under POMDP (Imperfect 
Information and Partial Observability). For an MDP, a decision maker is a "state taker," who 
observes and forecasts the state transition and makes decisions based on its perception. For a 
POMDP, a decision maker makes decisions based on incomplete information. The decision­
maker will be better off if more information about the system can be gained at reasonable 
cost. A decision maker will also be better off if the transition of system can, to some extend, 
be controlled. Comparing the results given by MDP, POMDP could identify the value of 
information or the system manipulating. 
This section focuses on the value of information, both perfect information and 
imperfect information. Table 22 and Table 23 provide the expected value for one MW 
generation capacity of the investigated generation unit in each state group or individual state 
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for a specific hour. It is shown that more information on the market improves the 
profitability of generation assets. The value of such information depends on the physical 
capabilities of the investigated generator and the electricity markets. If the market is in state 
5, where both supply and demand are moderate, the optimal operation is to keep the 
generation unit on. If the GENCO only knows that market is in state group_l, the optimal 
operation is to shut generation units off. Keeping generation unit on provides extra future. 
In this case, turning generation unit off provides only current profit, $9.3760/MWh. Keeping 
the generation unit on provides $12.0543/MWh, a difference of 28.56%. 
Table 22: Generation Unit Value Based on POMDP ($/MWh) 
Time 15PM 16PM 17PM 18PM 19PM 
Group_l 4.048 0 0 0 0 
Group 2 10.8760 2.6307 0 0 0 
Group 3 29.1599 13.7307 5.10234 1.0264 0 
Group_4 30.4773 16.1334 9.3970 5.2573 2.4875 
Table 23: Generation Unit Value Based on MDP, Perfect Information ($/MWh) 
Time 15PM 16PM 17PM 18PM 19PM 
State 1 3.1760 0 0 0 0 
State 5 12.0543 3.1696 0 0 0 
State 6 26.1616 14.5868 9.1060 4.9954 2.2550 
State 4 4.2160 0 0 0 0 
State 2 9.4875 2.0918 0 0 0 
State 7 12.7926 2.5691 0 0 0 
State 8 20.4768 8.6334 3.8530 0.2677 0 
State 3 20.3137 10.5442 5.5390 1.7851 0 
State 9 31.7262 18.6393 9.6880 5.5192 2.7400 
Equation 17 illustrates how to find the expected value of perfect information for a 
single market state or a market state group. Imperfect information could only define a 
probability distribution over a set of states, which provides less value. The value of 
imperfect information could be obtained as defined in Equation 17. It is also observed that 
more information may not provide any value when the optimal operation policy for a state 
group is consistent with the optimal operation policies for all individual states. The optimal 
strategy for call option on more information should be left expired under such situations. 
The absence of impact of physical constrains of generation assets in this example is due to 
the fact that generation unit is a very fast unit. 
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Value of Perfect Information for a Market State 
= Value by MDP for an individual state 
- Value by POMDP for an individual state 
=3.176-3.176 = 0 
=12.0543 - 9.3760 = 2.6783 
= 26.1616 - 22.808 = 3.3536 
Expected Value of Perfect Information for a State Group 
Slates in a Group 
= ^ Probabilty _ State _In_ Group * 
i=i 
Value of perfect information for a market state 
EVperfed,s,ale _ group =1-8445 = 
0.3514*0 + 0.4897 * 2.6784 + 0.1589 * 3.3536 
Equation 17: Value of Information Based on MDP and POMDP 
4.3 Investment in Generation Assets 
Short-term valuation of generation assets assumes HMM with fixed structure and 
deterministic parameters, while long-term valuation of generation assets confronts time-
varying Markov process structure and parameters. The structure of a Markov process refers 
to how many states an electricity market could enter, the relationship of all the states and so 
on. The parameters of a Markov process refer to the transition probability matrix and the 
price distributions given a specific system state. This section proposes to capture the 
uncertainties of model parameters with fuzzy sets and fuzzy numbers. The variability of 
model structure is proposed to be treated using scenarios analysis. 
The long-term valuation of generation assets, namely the valuation of investment in 
generation assets, requires a more fundamental model for electricity markets. This section 
reproduces example in Chapter 3, and applies Markov Model to Location Marginal Pricing 
(LMP) electricity markets. The HMM is modified to capture the long-term fuzziness. 
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Figure 33: Simplified Generation Assets Investment Transmission Network 
The to be valuated generation assets are assumed to located at Bus_3 shown in Figure 
33. This example analyzes one scenario, which implicitly assumes that the to be built 
generation plant at Bus_3 is a price-taker and will not affect the LMP at Bus_3. This 
assumption is only true provided two underlying assumptions hold: 
The "to be built" generation plant are more efficient than generators at Bus_l and 
Bus_2, and has a corresponding production cost lower than $10/MWh 
The 180MW demand shown in Bus_3 is residual demand after the to be built 
generation plant is committed. 
The price-taker assumption is employed to simplify the discussion. If the to-be-built 
generator could have impacts on the LMP, the system state and state transition matrix should 
be extended to include the impact of new generators. This work assumes a price-taker 
500MW base generator producing at $9/MWh while the total demand at Bus_3 ranges from 
550MW to 680MW to be consistent with the example. The lower production cost of the to-
be-built base generator leads to an always in-the-money call option. The optimal policy 
would be keeping the unit on whenever possible. This assumption also justifies the 
ignorance of most generator operating time constraints. For a base generation unit 
investigated in this scenario, most of the profit is gained during peak-hours. This example 
focuses on the impact of transmission network. 
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The Markov chain for valuation is modeled to include four market states jointly 
determined by the transmission network states and the investigated generation unit's 
operating status. The transmission network states space includes two states, depending 
whether the transmission line from Bus_l to Bus_3 is congested or not. Each state is defined 
by a two-element vector as shown in Equation-11. 
State _ l(Non - congested) State_2{Congestiori) : -1 
2 
Equation 18: Contribution Factor State Space for Generation Asset Investment Example 
If there are more than two adjacent buses that have impacts on the LMP of the 
investigated bus, a multiple-element vector should be defined. The state space of the 
generation unit is assumed to include only two states: On and Off. This simplification is 
consistent with the base generator assumption. A base generator normally operates either at 
full capacity or off. If detailed physical constraints are to be included in the formulation, the 
state space of the generation unit needs to be expanded to include different output levels and 
transition states. 
The market state transition is jointly determined by the demand level at Bus_3, generation 
offers from GENCOs at Bus_l and Bus_2, and the transmission capacity of the given 
regional transmission network. Assume the estimated crisp transition matrix as shown in 
Equation 19. 
Crisp _ State _Transition _ Matrix 
State _l_On State _2_ On State _l_Off State _2_Off 
State _\_On 0.8 0.2 0 0 
State _2_On 0.2 0.8 0 0 
State _ 1 _ Off 0 0 0.8 0.2 
State _2_Off 0 0 0.2 0.8 
Equation 19: Crisp State Transition Probability Matrix for Generation Asset Investment 
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A probability price distribution could capture the randomness of LMP prices for a 
given system state. Another alternative to capture the fuzziness of prices for a given system 
state is to utilize fuzzy numbers. 
Fuzzy numbers could enter the modeling of LMP by many ways. This work 
approaches modeling of LMP by construing a fuzzy states transition matrix to capture the 
fuzziness of electricity market movements. Fuzzy numbers are employed to define the 
possibilities of electricity market transition. The incorporation of fuzzy numbers leads to the 
formulation of generation assets valuating problems as fuzzy real call options. A fuzzy real 
option could be formulated as a fuzzy MDP, which could be solved with fuzzy linear 
programming. 
There are two approaches to implement fuzzy linear programming: 
• Zimmermann's approach [55] 
• Tanaka and Asais (T&A's) approach [56] 
Both Zimmermann's and T&A's approaches can be used to solve fuzzy linear 
programming problems, where each of them is targeted at different problem structures. More 
discussion can be found [57]. Once the fuzzy linear programming problem is solved, then 
the following results are expected [58][59]: 
• Optimal operation strategies such as unit commitment and economic dispatch 
• Sensitivity analysis of physical constraints including transmission and 
generation parameters 
• Dynamic hedging and portfolio management insights 
This work adopts T&A's for it allows sensitivity analysis on the constraints, which 
could not be achieved neither by regular sensitivity analysis nor parametric analysis. This 
feature is of great value to long-term scenarios analysis. T&A's approach uses fuzzy 
numbers to model all the coefficients in a LP problem—namely coefficients in constraint 
matrix, objective function, and right-hand side vector as shown in Equation 20. 
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min Z = C' X => -z' 
v-Â b 
x>0 
s.t.AX < b => Fuzzy Functions 
X>0 =>X >0 
Equation 20: T&A Approach for Fuzzy Linear Programming Formulation 
Fuzzy numbers are special cases of fuzzy sets and this work applies triangle fuzzy numbers 
as shown in Figure 34. A symmetric triangle fuzzy numbers is defined by its center a and 
half-width c. 
Membership ç [0,1] 
a+ c a - c  
Figure 34: Symmetric Triangle Fuzzy Number 
A fuzzy function is a generalization of a classical crisp function and it can be defined 
in many ways. This work adopts a classical definition for fuzzy function of fuzzy numbers 
as illustrated below. Assume a function Y - f(X,A) with its inputs, outputs and parameters 
X,Y,and A all defined as crisp numbers. Given a parameter set A , this function maps X to 
Y. Given a fuzzy number Â, a fuzzy function /:% -><p(Y) mapping X to 
<p( Y) : set of all fuzzy subsets on Y is defined by a membership function on Y. 
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Membership function for Y 
[P-A{a)\, {a\y = f(x,a)}*0 I 
Mr ( y )  =  
0, otherwise 
Equation 21: Definition of Fuzzy Function 
This work begins with deterministic price presentations, and then extends to fuzzy 
numbers. The cost/payoff for different combinations of system states and decisions are 
shown in Equation 22. The non-feasible decisions are assigned a large cost M to preserve 
infeasibility in the solution. The startup cost is assumed to be 1000 while the shutdown cost 
is assumed to be zero. 
The valuation of the to-be-built generator is formulated as a MDP problem and solved 
as a Linear Programming (LP) problem. Equation 23 defines variables for the problem while 
the crisp LP problem is defined in Equation 24. 
Cost / Payoff 
Stay _Off Stay _On Turn __On Turn_Off 
State _l_On —M 500 —M 0 
State _2_On -M 2500 —M 0 
State_\_Off 0 —M —1000 —M 
State _2_Off 0 -M -1000 -M 
Equation 22: Crisp Payoff Matrix for Generation Asset Investment Example 
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System State i = 1,2,3,4 for Non - Congested, Congestion, 
Unit _ On, Unit _ Off 
Decision k = 0(StayOjf),l(StayOn),2(TurnOJf),3(TurnOn) 
Y lk  = Prob(State = i and Decision = k) 
Steady State Unconditional Probability 
C, k = Cost / Payoff {State = i and Decision = k) 
P t  j = Prob(State = i and Transition_To = j) 
System State Transition Probability 
D; t  = Prob(Decision = A: | State = i ) 
Randomized Policy, Conditional Probability 
Equation 23: Variables Definition of Crisp Linear Programming Problem for Generation Assets 
Investment 
Maximize Z = 
i=7 Jfc=0 
1=7 /t=0 
A = 0 i=; fc=0 
t=0 
Equation 24: Crisp Linear Programming Problem for Generation Assets Investment 
This work then incorporates fuzzy information to capture the uncertainties and 
fuzziness of long-term forecast. The movements of prices of electricity are represented using 
fuzzy numbers, and those fuzzy numbers contribute to a fuzzy objective. The constraints 
defining the market movements are represented with fuzzy functions, where fuzzy transition 
matrix is employed. The fuzzy state transition matrix is defined by replacing probabilities 
with possibilities using fuzzy numbers as in Equation 25. 
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Fuzzy ^ Transition _ Matrix 
State „ 1 __ On State _2_On State _\_Off State _2_Off 
State _\_On 0.8 0.2 0 0 
State _2_On 0.2 0.8 0 0 
State _\_Off 0 0 0.8 0.2 
State _2_Off 0 0 0.2 0.8 
Equation 25: Fuzzy State Transition Possibility Matrix 
The costs/payoffs are defined for a combination of system state and feasible decision 
depend on the fuel prices, GENCO's O&M cost, and other economic drivers. This work 
captures the fuzziness of costs/payoffs by fuzzy numbers as shown in Equation 26. 
Cost / Payoff 
Stay _ Off Stay _On Turn_On Turn_Ojf 
State _l_On -M 500 -M 0 
State _2_On -M 2500 -M 0 
State _\_Off 0 -M -Ï000 -M 
State _ 2 _ Off 0 -M -1000 -M 
Equation 26: Fuzzy Payoffs of Generation Assets Investment 
The fuzzy LP problem is as shown in Equation 27 
Maximize Z = £ C ik  Y ik  
i=l k = 0 
sr.  T I X = 1  
i=l k=0 
1 2 1 
Er ,.i-ZE%(&)=OY/  = o. .M 
k=0 i=J k=0 
Policy D i l :  = ]  a  
k=0 
Equation 27: Fuzzy Linear Programming Problem for Generation Assets Investment 
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To be noticed that coefficients in constraint matrix P ik  and objective function C ik  are 
defined by fuzzy numbers. The fuzzy linear programming problem shown in Equation 27 
could be transformed into a crisp non-linear problem as shown in Equation 28. The result of 
this transformation is a non-linear programming problem, which can be solved by the 
successive solving of linear programming problems. 
Maximize A 
s.t. (ai -Ac()x > 0, 
a t, c, are the center, width of tri - angle fuzzy number 
Equation 28: Transformation of Fuzzy LP into Non-Linear Programming Problem 
The solution for the crisp LP problem shown in Equation 24 and fuzzy LP problem 
shown in Equation 27 is given in Table 24. 
Table 24: Solutions for Crisp and Fuzzy Linear Programming Problems (Generation Assets Investment) 
Crisp LP Problem Fuzzy LP Problem 
Operation Policy Always On Always On 
Generation Value 1500/MWh 
Triangle Fuzzy Number 
(1500,300) IMWh 
The results shown in Table 24 are for one scenario within one single time interval as 
shown in Figure 35. The same approach could apply to multiple scenarios and time intervals, 
as well as intermediate and peak generation assets. 
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Mid-Term 1 
MM 1 
Mid-Term 1' 
MM_1' > 
Mid-Term_2" 
MM 2" <C 
Mid-Term 2' 
MM 2' 
Mid-Term_2 
MM 2 
Mid-Term 3' r 
MMJ' I > 
Mid-Term_l" 
MM_1" 
Long-Term_l 
MM_1 
V '  1 
Mid-Term 2 
MM 2 
Long-Term_2 
MM_2 
1 
Mid-Term_3" 
MM_3" 
Long-Term_3 
MM_3 
Market Movement lead to changes in parameters of Markov Model 
Market Movement lead to different Markov Model 
Figure 35: Long Term Markov Model for Electricity Markets 
The fuzzy-number based real option analysis provides potential investor an efficient 
valuation strategy for generation assets. Multiple Markov models allow incorporating 
significant market movements, which is common for the long time span of generation assets. 
The decomposition of LMP movements into physical and economic drivers provides a 
framework to capture the location-depend and time-varying value of generation assets. The 
location-depend and time-varying value of generation assets determines the site and 
technology of to be invested generation assets. The fuzzy approach enhances the modeler's 
capability to incorporate subjective judgments when long-term forecast is not available or 
could only be obtained at prohibitive cost. The fuzzy feature also provides an efficient tool 
for comparing different investment opportunities in generation assets. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Generation assets valuation and investment are of critical importance for electric 
power industry re-regulation. Real option analysis provides a promising methodology to 
capture and quantify the embedded operating flexibilities of generation assets. 
Improvements and refinements on applying real option analysis to valuating generation 
assets have been extensively investigated. Most of the efforts are two-folded, enforcing the 
physical constraints of operating generation assets and capturing the unique features of 
electricity prices movements. 
Electricity, as a special commodity, demonstrates unique features on its markets 
movements. The time-varying and location-dependent value of electricity should be captured 
by an open framework, which combines both physical and market information efficiently. 
Generation assets, as real assets, embed structured operating flexibilities and 
constraints. The short-term operating constraints, combined with volatile and incomplete 
information, requires a valuation tool providing tractability and insights. 
This work proposes an integrated valuation framework, which is built to address not 
only the constraints of operating generation assets, but also their impacts on the market 
movements. The Hidden Markov Model combines the strengths of both Mark-To-Market 
approach and production cost modeling approach. Information coming both from the market 
and other sources are integrated into an open framework. This framework is rich in its 
structure to allow refinements if warranted by valuation purposes and availability of data on 
markets. Electricity markets could be decomposed into electric energy and ancillary services 
markets in the HMM framework. This HMM framework also allows to decompose the 
markets drivers in different ways, supply v.s. demand forces, and physical v.s. economic 
forces. The HMM framework is also extensible from short-term to long term. The 
incorporation of fuzzy sets and numbers allows the incorporation of subjective judgments 
and capture of market uncertainties and fuzziness 
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This work proposes real option analysis to valuate generation assets. Generation 
assets valuation problems are formulated as Partially Observable Markov Decision Problem 
(POMDP), which is identified as a real option analysis approach. The incorporation of 
incomplete information identifies the inconsistence between electricity markets states and 
observed prices. It is shown that optimal operation of generation assets could be achieved 
based on the electricity markets states instead of observed markets prices. Long-term 
generation assets investment is formulated as fuzzy MDP. The incorporation of fuzzy 
information facilitates incorporating subjective forecast. 
This work incorporates more information; both market information and engineering 
insights. It takes both the operating flexibilities and operating constraints into consideration 
when valuating generation assets. This approach could be used to establish future markets 
for electricity markets. 
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Appendix 
A.l Regulatory History of the U.S. Electric Power Industry 
The U.S. electric power industry had operated un-regulated, regulated and it is now 
being re-regulated. A review of such an evolution sheds light on the on-going re-regulation 
worldwide. Before re-regulation, electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
had been considered to be a "natural monopoly." It was believed that the electric power 
industry operates most efficiently as a monopoly because of its decreasing average long-run 
costs due to economy of scale. Today, there is a widespread view among legislators, 
regulators, industry analysts, and economists that the generation segment of electric power 
industry in today's environment would be more efficient and economical in a competitive 
market. In contrast, transmission and distribution segments will remain regulated and 
noncompetitive while generation segment of the electric power industry is being restructured. 
The electric power industry is currently in the midst of a transition from a vertically 
integrated and regulated monopoly to horizontally integrated entities in a competitive market 
where both customers and suppliers trade freely. Although the electric industry keeps 
evolving, the economic drive behind all those re-structuring remains the same, seeking cheap 
and reliable electric power supply. 
The electric power industry began with Edison Electric Illuminating Company and 
operated un-regulated from 1882. Early electric power companies were inefficient and 
redundant in the services they provided. Both technical and economic issues contributed to 
the inefficiency. Companies used different equipments, voltages, and frequencies so their 
systems were not compatible, and were isolated. All companies operated on small scales, 
and provided all services by themselves, and no economy of scale was realized. One single 
company generated, and delivered the electric power supply to customers by its own point-
to-point distribution lines. In order to operate, the companies had to acquire franchise rights 
from the local municipalities. Electric power companies frequently operated under 
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nonexclusive franchises that were often in competition with one another. The award of 
franchises was often based on bribing government officers and no transparency and equality 
was presented. Franchise territories differed greatly, from a single block to the entire city. 
The franchise process kept the industry fragmented and inefficient. The issuance of 
numerous short-term franchises created an uncertain, chaotic operating environment. It was 
during these early years that entrepreneurs like Samuel Insull, who had worked with Edison, 
gave his attention to utility operations and began to shape and define important economic 
concepts which still govern modern utility planning and pricing. 
Early industry leaders recognized that electric power companies suffered from high 
fixed capital costs as a result of the heavy investment needed to finance central generating 
plants and distribution systems. At the same time, the variable costs were relatively low. 
Fixed costs reflected the fix amount of investment that must be paid regardless of output, and 
they included electric power system construction and equipment. Variable costs were those 
that varied with the level of electricity output and included fuel expenses. Samuel Insull 
understood that with more customers on an electric power system, more revenue was 
generated spreading out fixed costs. With the development of the electricity demand meter, 
Samuel Insull reduced prices of electricity and aggressively marketed to attract more 
customers. The electricity demand meter measured not only a customer's peak electricity 
demand, or the "share" of fixed cost required for usage, but also the actual electricity used. 
Samuel Insull set the price of electricity to cover both of these costs: fixed (demand share) 
and variable (electric energy). Ancillary services were bundled together with electric energy 
and no separate pricing was implemented. Later, this pricing practice was replaced by a flat 
rate in the regulated electric power industry. Other pricing practices had been proposed, such 
as differentiating prices between peak hours and non-peak hours to provide incentives for 
demand side management. Re-regulation may introduce new pricing structure, which are not 
necessarily to be one of the above. An Electricity Service Company (ESCO) can devise new 
price structures to serve customer utilizing the load management programs effectively. 
Early analyses showed that the more time a generation plant was in use, the higher the 
profit with a lower average cost to customers. Since electricity could not be stored the trick 
was to find the right mix of customers to utilize the plant for as much of a day as possible. 
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For example, in order to maximize plants to their fullest, one might supply the early morning 
and late afternoon streetcar load, an evening residential lighting load, and a business and 
industrial load between the two streetcar-peak loads. Samuel Insull realized that the same 
three loads could be served by one plant instead of three different plants that were then being 
used. In addition to load diversity, it was discovered that technically increased efficiency 
could be realized through economy of scale. One large centrally located power station could 
be operated more cheaply than numerous isolated small generating units. However, both 
load diversity and economy of scale required a well-connected electric power delivery 
system. The formation of the electric power industry was heavily influenced by the inherent 
advantage in serving many customers, the desirability of load diversity, and building to 
achieve economies of scale. Today, with the advent of Combine Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) 
and some renewable energy plants, smaller generation units can again be cost effective and 
more environment friendly. Also, new technology makes the building of a power plant 
quicker and cheaper. Such technology advances make the competition with the electricity 
generation segment possible and worthwhile. This technical trend has been the one of the 
motivations for re-regulation and will influence the re-construction of the electric power 
industry. 
Before regulation, electric power companies frequently found that it was difficult to 
maintain investor confidence and attract adequate capital. This was attributable to both the 
dubious franchise process, which made operation of the utility over the long term an 
uncertain prospect, and the low returns investors received. Early industry leaders began to 
think that if the franchise granting process and the rates charged by electric power companies 
were overseen by a nonpartisan state agency instead of a city council, financing might be 
easier and cheaper to obtain. A higher level agency not only led to a relatively stable 
franchise, which mitigated the long-term operation risk and lowered the cost of capital, but 
also made the integration of isolated electric power systems feasible. Such a belief led to the 
regulation by state agencies after 1898. With re-regulation, operational risks present 
themselves again and bring market risk to the investment in utilities. The operation risks of 
the electric power industry require a mechanism to allocate, share and management of such 
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risks. Also, Federal Energy Regulation Committee (FERC) is pursuing more regulation 
authority to meet the challenge of operating a gigantic electric power system. 
In 1898, Samuel Insull proposed that electric power companies be regulated by state 
agencies that would establish rates and set service standards. The idea became increasingly 
appealing to Investor-Owned Utilities (IOU) in the face of public enthusiasm for the growth 
of municipal electric systems. Privately owned electric power companies surmised that the 
public might be more supportive if their companies were regulated so that customer interest 
would be protected. By 1916, 33 states had regulatory agencies in U.S. Early regulation of 
the industry proved beneficial to both the electric power companies and to their customers 
who got reliable, reasonably priced service without the uncertainties caused by duplicate 
services and inefficient operations. It is believed by many that re-regulation will benefit both 
the electric power industry and its customers because many regulation-induced distortions 
will be removed and the re-regulated electric power industry is motivated to lower the cost of 
meeting demand. 
As the regulation of the electric industry evolved, an electric utility began to service 
as a natural monopoly because a single company providing electricity was more 
economically efficient for its eliminating of duplication of service, equipments and economy 
of scale. Regulated electric utilities assumed certain common characteristics of their rights 
and obligations. These included: 
• Assignment of Franchise or Service Territory 
• An exclusive franchise grants an electric utility to serve customers within a 
designated geographic area, known as its service territory, often for a 
relatively long time; 
• Obligation to Serve 
In return for the exclusive franchise, an electric utility is required to serve all existing 
and future customers equally and at a reasonable rate, which is under the authority of 
regulators; 
By 1935, utilities had seen dramatically growth under the regulation of states 
governments. The electric power industry changed dramatically both technically and 
economically. Bigger and more capital-intensive electricity generation units were built to 
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pursue economy of scale. High voltage long distance transmission networks began to 
emerge, which connected existing intrastate electric power networks into interstate electric 
power networks. Electric utilities operating in different states were connected together, and 
coordinated their operation. Often those connected utilities were owned and controlled by 
holding companies, companies with controlling shares in other companies producing services 
and goods. Holding companies performed the coordination of interstate transmission of 
electricity internally, and provided common services to its holding utilities such as financing, 
maintenances of equipments. Three huge holding companies, along with more than 100 
other holding companies, existed and produced half of the electricity in the U.S. The lack of 
federal regulation agents and the holding companies' size and complexity made industry 
regulation and oversight control by the states agents impossible. Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) criticized that many holding companies were raising the cost of electricity to 
consumers. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also investigated this matter 
and publicly charged that the holding companies had been guilty of stock watering and 
capital inflation, manipulation of subsidiaries, and improper accounting practices. After re-
regulation, the financing practice of the electric power industry comes again into focus, 
especially after Enron's accounting scandal. 
Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935 aimed at breaking up the 
unconstrained and excessively large holding companies that then controlled the U.S. 
electricity and gas distribution networks. Under PUHCA, the SEC was charged with the 
administration of the Act and the regulation of the holding companies. One of the most 
important features of the Act was that the SEC was given the power to break up the massive 
interstate holding companies by requiring them to divest their holdings until each became a 
single consolidated system serving a circumscribed geographic area. Technically, the 
connected electric power systems were divided into control areas based on the strength of 
their electrical connection. Each control area included a set of roughly balanced generation 
units and loads with relatively strong connections, while control areas connected with each 
other with relatively weak connections. One control area coordinated the production, 
transportation, and consumption of electricity within its own reaches, and interchanges 
among control areas. One utility might have one more than one control areas, and the 
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interchanges of electricity between different utilities were implemented by bilateral contracts. 
Another feature of the PUHCA 1935 permitted holding companies to engage only in business 
that was essential and appropriate for the operation of a single vertically integrated utility. 
This latter restriction practically eliminated the participation of non-utility companies in 
wholesale electric power sales. The law contained a provision that all holding companies 
had to register with the SEC, which was authorized to supervise and regulate the holding 
company system. Through the registration process, the SEC decided whether the holding 
company would need to be regulated under or exempt from the requirements of PUHCA. 
The SEC also was charged with regulating the issuance and acquisition of securities by 
holding companies. Strict limitations on intra-system transactions and political activities 
were also imposed. PUHCA put utilities under more regulation and kept the cost of 
supplying reliable electric power relatively low. During today's worldwide re-regulation, 
some countries are alert to the holding company issues, namely the high concentration of 
generation assets. For example, Australia requires the divested generation capacities to be 
sold to different entities. In the U.S, no such requirements are in operation now. However, 
market power and market manipulation are under intensive monitoring. 
During 1970s, the U.S. electric power industry was hit by severe unforeseen changes. 
Technology failed to make bigger nuclear generation units more efficient and the claim that 
electric power would be too cheap to measure was proved to be wrong. Another change was 
that the pattern of load increase changed from exponential increase pattern to saturated 
increase pattern. Those two changes resulted in less-utilized capital-intensive electricity 
generation units. The following oil embargo of 1973 led to the high cost of input for electric 
utilities. The poor planning of utilities further deteriorated the unfavorable impacts, and 
increased the cost of electric power. Under the cost-based regulation, utilities managed to 
convince the regulators to increase the rate of service and recouped cost from customers. All 
those changes led to Public Utility Regulation Policies Act (PURPA). PURPA stipulated that 
electric utilities had to interconnect with and buy, at the utilities' avoided cost, capacity and 
energy offered by any non-utility facility meeting certain criteria established by FERC. 
PURPA allowed some non-utilities to enter the franchised electric and gas utilities. The 
concept of natural monopoly was removed from mind set. PURPA also started the 
101 
disintegration of electric utilities from vertically orientated to horizontally integrate by 
contracts. PURPA was designed to encourage the efficient use of fossil fuels in electric 
power production through co-generators and the use of renewable resources through small 
power producers. The main objective was reducing the US's dependence on foreign oil but 
not re-regulation. Although PURPA contributes to the deployment of renewable energy 
under regulation, it hinders the incorporating of renewable energy into electricity markets 
when re-regulation began. For example, wind generators are still qualified as Small Power 
Producer Qualifying Facility (SPP QF) under PURPA. Thus wind generators hesitate to 
enter the uncertain electricity markets. California Independent System Operator (CAISO) 
proposed Participating Intermittent Resource Program (PIRP) to encourage wind generators 
to join the CA electricity market. 
New technologies and successful re-regulation of several 'regulated natural 
monopolies' such as natural gas, airlines, and telecommunications motivated the re-
regulation of the electric power industry. Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992 opened 
access to transmission networks and exempted certain non-utilities from the restrictions of 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935. In 1996, FERC issued Order 
888 that further opened transmission access to non-utilities, thereby establishing wholesale 
competition. FERC Order 889 requires electric utilities to establish electronic systems to 
share information about available transmission capacity. A few electricity markets were set 
up and put into operation, such as CAISO, PJM, ERCOT, BETA, European Internal markets, 
Australian Victoria electricity markets among others. While all those electricity markets are 
trying to promote competition, they pursue it in different ways by adopting different market 
frameworks such as electric power pool, exchange, bi-lateral contracts and others. The 
searching for better framework for re-regulation never stops. The U.S. electric power 
industry has been searching for an optimal re-regulation framework. The creation of ISO 
(Independent System Operator), RTO (Regional Transmission Organization), ITP 
(Independent Transmission Provider), STD (Standard Market Design), and WPMP 
(Wholesale Power Market Platform) was proposed 2004. All those changes aim to provide 
true open access to GENCOs, while maintaining the reliability of electric power supply. 
Although an all-around universal market framework may not exit, lessons have been learned 
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that more structural changes and coordination need to be done. The blackout of Aug 14th, 
2003 which occurred at the edges of PJM and MWISO seemed to support FERC's vision that 
a free-traded market yet well-coordinated electric power system. Besides market 
frameworks, other regulations changes are evolving parallel with re-regulation of the electric 
power industry, such as policies regarding renewable energy and environments. At the same 
time, repeal of PUHCA and PURPA is under discussion in the legislative sector of US. 
Beside legislation evolution, electricity markets also see structural changes. The time-
varying and location-dependent value of electricity is recognized. Location Marginal Prices 
framework is implemented by PJM, MISO and other regional electricity markets. ERCOT is 
transiting from zonal prices to nodal prices, while the California electricity market redesign 
also adopts nodal prices. 
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A. 2 A Brief Comparison of Some Exiting Electricity Markets 
The market structures adopted in exiting electricity markets are, to a large extent, 
characterized by the scope of activities and authority delegated to the entity responsible for 
day-to-day operation of the transmission system, i.e., the system operator. These features 
vary widely among the different ISOs existing or emerging in the U.S. and other countries. 
To facilitate the comparison of market structures, it is helpful to consider the ISO's role and 
responsibilities in each of the following areas: 
• Operations planning and scheduling 
• Dispatching of generation resources 
• Real-time transmission system control and monitoring 
• On-line network security analysis 
• Market operations and settlements 
• Transmission planning, ownership and maintenance 
The minimum or core responsibility of all existing and emerging ISOs is the 
coordination of operations planning within the ISO's area of jurisdiction. A "minimalist 
ISO" would intervene in operations planning and scheduling only in case the schedules 
developed by the participants (PX, SCs, etc.) are likely to result in transmission congestion. 
The ISO would then coordinate measures to alleviate the congestion. The minimalist ISO 
would not usually perform real-time control through automatic generation control (AGC). It 
may, however, monitor the operation of the power system to ensure adequacy of available 
reserves and other pertinent ancillary services. Examples of a minimalist ISO are ERCOT, 
and the structure being contemplated for MAPP. At the other end of the spectrum, some 
existing or emerging ISOs have a wide range of authority and enjoy extensive centralized 
control. In addition to the basic functions of a minimalist ISO, a maximalist ISO would: 
• Perform generation scheduling (possibly including unit commitment), and 
scheduling of ancillary services 
• Dispatch generation for energy imbalance and ancillary services, as well as 
congestion management 
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• Perform real-time control of generation, transmission, and ancillary resources 
• Facilitate a forward (day-ahead and/or hour-ahead) energy market 
• Plan and execute transmission system expansion (although it may or may not 
own the transmission assets). 
The PJM ISO is an example of a maximalist ISO. The National Grid Company 
(NGC) in the U.K. is another example, in which the ISO assumes ownership of transmission 
assets also. 
The following figure shows schematically how the functionalities of different ISO 
based on the scope and extent of authority and control. In this figure, the degree of ISO 
authority and control increases from left to right: to the left are those ISOs with minimal 
authority and control; to the right are those ISOs with maximal authority and centralized 
control. 
( IndeGO ) California England MAPP 
New York Victoria Mid-West 
ISO Zealand 
Less ISO Authority 
and Control 
More ISO Authority 
and Control 
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A.3 Time Sequence of Key Activities in CAISO and PX Market 
Operations 
Dav Ahead California ISO California PX 
2 days ahead — by 6 PM Evaluate & publish public market 
information. 
Dav ahead — 6:00 to 6:30 
AM 
Receive SC load forecasts; aggregate 
DAC loads: send aggregated DAC loads 
to UDCs. 
By 7:00 AM Receive participants' portfolio energy 
supply & demand bids for each hour-
By 7:15 AM Conduct energy auction & notify 
successful bidders of hourly MCPs & 
quantities. 
By 9:10 AM Receive participants' Initial Preferred 
Schedules, identifying specific 
generating units & loads that fulfill 
aggregate awards in the energy auction; 
receive adjustment bids for inter-zonal 
congestion management. 
Bv 9:30 AM Receive A/S bids. 
By 10:00 AM Receive & validate preferred energy & 
self-provided A/S schedules & bids from 
allSCs. 
Submit to ISO preferred energy 
schedules, A/S & adjustment bids. 
10:00 to 11:00 AM Perform A S auction & inter-zonal 
congestion management: develop & 
publish adjusted energy schedules, A S 
schedules & MCPs, & estimated 
congestion charges. NOTE: energy & 
A/S schedules will be Final if there is no 
inter-zonal congestion. 
By 12:00 noon If 10 AM schedules had inter-zonal 
congestion, receive & validate revised 
preferred energy & self-provided A/S 
schedules & bids. 
Submit to ISO revised schedules. PX 
always submits same energy schedules 
as 10 AM, but may have revised A/S 
bids. 
12:00 noon to 1:00 PM Perform A/S auction & inter-zonal 
congestion management; develop & 
publish Final energy schedules, A/S 
schedules & MCPs, & congestion 
charges. 
By 1:15 PM Send to participants Final energy & A/S 
schedules & congestion charges; 
calculate zonal MCPs. 
By 1:30 PM approx. Determine any deficiencies in A/S 
markets: evaluate RMR requirements 
relative to Final schedules. 
By 5:00 PM approx. Publish any changes to Final schedules 
due to AS shortfall & RMR 
requirements. 
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Hour Ahead California ISO California PX 
By 3 hours ahead Receive participants' energy supply & 
demand bids, relative to Final DA 
schedules. 
By 2 hrs 50 min ahead Calculate MCPs & quantities, determine 
preferred schedules. 
By 2 hour s ahead Receive & validate energy schedules, & 
self-provided A/S schedules & bids. 
Receive participants' adjustment & A/S 
bids; include with preferred schedules 
submitted to ISO. 
2 hrs to 1 hr ahead Perform A/S auction & congestion 
management; develop & publish Final 
energy schedules, AS schedules & 
MCPs, congestion charges, & GMMs. 
By 1 hour ahead Transmit ISO Final schedules to 
participants. 
Prior to opera tin s hour Calculate & publish zonal MCPs. 
Real-time - Prior to 
Operating Hour 
California ISO California PX 
By 1 hour ahead Receive participants' supplemental 
energy bids. 
By 45 min ahead of 
operating hour 
Receive supplemental energy bids for 
real-time market. 
By 20 nun ahead Accept ETC schedules not already 
scheduled in DA or HA markets. 
Real-time - Within 
Operating Hour 
California ISO California PX 
By 10 minutes ahead of 
operating instant 
Receive actual system load & MW 
generation on AGC (from PMS). 
10 min, ahead to operating 
instant 
Determine energy imbalances & 
dispatch winning supplemental bids via 
PMS. 
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